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Abstract

The rapid development of information and communication technology has enabled
more people to outsource and store their data on the networked databases. However,
it brings challenges related to the data privacy and security.
Our research focuses on the privacy in which the party who requests for a service
discloses the minimum amount of personal information, whereas the party that o↵ers
data is able to ensure that only the requested data are revealed. Particularly, we
focus on the mechanism searching for keywords on encrypted data.
There are numbers of techniques that can be applied in the keyword search,
such as public encryption with keyword search (PEKS), oblivious transfer (OT),
private information retrieval (PIR), symmetric key encryption and homomorphic
encryption. In this work, we consider PEKS, symmetric key encryptions and OT to
perform oblivious keyword search. Our work can be summarized as follows.
• Keyword search in designated senders. Most of current keyword search schemes
only consider the keyword stored in the email gateway or database service

providers. Hence, an o↵-line keyword guessing attack was developed to perform brute force attacks on a limited keyword space. An efficient solution is
providing another element, for example, the sender’s identity, in the ciphertext in order to improve the security of encrypted keywords. This allows us to
achieve a new cryptography primitive namely keyword search with designated
signers.
• Symmetric key encryption that provides a better security level than the other
ones. The underlying principle of a symmetric key encryption is that the sender
and the receiver must share the same secret key. We propose a construction
based on the public key infrastructure that allows the sender and the receiver
to exchange their public keys and construct a secret key. This scheme is
based on a computable assumption that is more secure than the one based on
v

decisional assumption.
• Oblivious keyword search. The idea of oblivious keyword search is from the
oblivious transfer (OT). The security of OT requires that both sender’s and
receiver’s privacy are preserved. Therefore, from the privacy point of view,
OT is suitable for enabling privacy of outsourced data.
• Public key encryption with oblivious keyword search. Combining the notions
of PEKS and OT, we propose an oblivious keyword search scheme. The new

scheme achieves the properties of both PEKS and OT. We note that the combination is done in a non-trivial manner in order to ensure the security of the
system.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
With rapid development of information and communication technology, more and
more people outsource or store their data on the networked databases. However, it
brings some challenges related to privacy and security of the data. The information
not only contains the users’ names and email addresses, but also includes some
keywords related to contents or the preferences of users. Let us look at this scenario:
assuming there is a perfect security scheme to protect your email or outsourced
data, when the number of your emails or files grows large enough, you are not able
to locate a single file in seconds by searching manually. To avoid this, you need
to use keywords to search. Thus, the information of data will be revealed by the
terms of you search if there is no protections. Certainly, data privacy is a hot
topic in current cryptography and attracts many attentions in current cryptography
[DVFJ+ 07, GSMB03, WLOB09, YSK09], and there is no doubt that the privacy on
keyword search is another interesting issue.
At the beginning, information retrieval is a technology that provides people to
collect the information easily. These tools such as google search engine have really
improved people’s life. Moreover, the technology itself is improving everyday. Combining with the techniques of voice control, artificial intelligence and some other
technologies, everyday life is much easier. The technology such as the Apple company’s new product “Siri”, we can just say “Hi Siri, Where is the best restaurant
near us ?” and “How can we get there ?”. Then the name and the route to the
restaurant will display on the phone. Unfortunately, this would be insecure in some
specific scenarios. For example, the service provider may record and analyze your
search results, or send advertisement or junk mail to your email address accordingly. In addition, when you store some confidential information such as employees’
salaries on the outsourced database, the opponent company may eavesdrop your
communication with database server to acquire the information. Moreover, the
1
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competitive company may corrupt the database server to obtain the information
illegally. Therefore, it is worth to pay more attention to the security of communication by the service providers. It is always being concerned how to reveal the
minimum secret to the service provider and gain more information.
Nevertheless, in some specific contexts, the users may try their best to obtain
extra information from the service provider. Hence, not only the behavior of service
providers, but also users’, need to be concerned.

1.1

Crypto-Based Keyword Search

To achieve privacy preserving keyword search, one of the most feasible solution is
to apply cryptography on it. Regardless of emails or outsourced data, we should
encrypt them prior to sending or storing them. Although encryption in a suitable
form can improve the data confidentiality, it will cause more problems on data
handling and maintenance. One of possible solutions is to decrypt all the ciphertexts,
re-encrypt them after reading and store them back to the database server. However,
this method is complicated and time-consuming, hence it is inefficient, especially in
the case that the quantity of emails or outsourced data is extremely large. Thus,
crypto-based keyword search is a viable solution.
The first encryption scheme for data transformation should be backward to oblivious transfer (OT ) in 1981, which is proposed by Rabin [Rab81]. In this protocol, a
sender may transfer a message to the receiver who has 1/2 probability of getting it,
while the sender is not able to ensure whether the receiver is going to acquire the
message. Then the concept has been extended to 1-out-of-n OT [BCR86, BCR87]
and t-out-of-n OT [NP99b], which means that a receiver wants to obtain 1 or t
of n messages from sender, the sender is not able to confirm which message is the
receiver’s choice. Meanwhile the receiver can only obtain 1 or t message(s) from
sender. OT not only improves the sender’s privacy, but also protects the receiver’s
choice.
Following the concept of OT , Chor et al. proposed the notion of private information retrieve (PIR) in 1995 [CKGS98]. In their protocol, a user is able to retrieve
an item from database server without revealing anything else. This seems to have
addressed the problem that privacy of the keyword searcher should be protected.
Unfortunately, some researchers pointed out that it was a weak version of 1-out-of-n
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Figure 1.1: Crypto-Based Keyword Search

OT, and the confidentiality of service providers had not been considered. Nevertheless, after the improvement by Kushilevitz et al. [KO97], the PIR improves the
communication efficiency.
With the introduction of the pairing and Identity Based Encryption (IBE) [BF03,
Sha85], the public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme was proposed
by Boneh et al. [BCOP04]. Their scheme enables users to create trapdoors that
contain one or several keyword(s) to the email gateway. According to the user’s
requirements, the gateway will route the email that contains certain keywords to be
sent to the assigned digital devices. Other emails will be stored in the mail box to be
delivered later. It is an extremely valuable crypto application since digital devices
are ubiquitous. Moreover, it supplies keyword search with public key encryption,
in such a case that people do not need to share the secret key among the data
holders. It also provides a method to achieve a non-interactive keyword search.
However, there are still some remaining problems, which attract attention, such
as the ones mentioned in [ABC+ 05, BSNS05, BW06, CKRS09]. Additionally, no
scheme is able to solve the problems thoroughly. Hence, our first work addresses the
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o↵-line keyword guessing attack mentioned in the literature.
Furthermore, we will discuss the keyword search in cloud computing. Cloud computing provides dynamic, scalable, and pay-as-you-use services. As for the privacy
and security reasons, sensitive data has been encrypted prior to outsourcing. Therefore, it is still an interesting topic to provide an efficient and suitable method to conduct the keyword search on encrypted data [CWL+ 11, LWW09, WCL+ 10, ZB07].
In the cloud scenario, due to the specific environment, keyword search should be
obeyed strictly that service providers have no access to receiver’s search results, and
the receiver has no admission on the rest of the documents. In addition, this method
suits the property of pay-as-you-use in cloud computing.

1.2

Goal of the Thesis

We propose several schemes that solve the problem of revealing private information
in these scenarios:
1. Suppose Alice is an email user. Due to the development of information technology, Alice is able to read her email on several devices: desktop, laptop,
smart phone, iPad, etc. For convenience, she may set some keywords to her
email gateway so that only the message which contains these keywords will
be routed to her smart phone. Others will be sent to her desktop or laptop
to be dealt with during her working hours. For instance, Bob wants to send
two emails to Alice with the keywords “urgent” and “lunch” respectively and
has encrypted using Alice’s public key. Alice has set the gateway that only
emails containing the keyword “urgent” to be directed to her smart phone.
Therefore, the former letter will be sent to smart phone and latter will be
sent to desktop. In this scenario, Alice will send a trapdoor to gateway to
perform the setting. Nevertheless, the trapdoor isn’t secure enough to prevent
the malicious attack. For example, the one who acquires the trapdoor in some
way may conduct o↵-line attacks to the trapdoor. Roughly speaking, the attacker could use brute force to guess the trapdoor, since the keywords space
is limited. Therefore, we try to make a better keyword trapdoor resisting to
the o↵-line keyword guessing attacks.
2. Similar to the scenario 1, Charlie and David are email users. Charlie wishes to
set a keyword to email gateway that only allows the email encrypted under that
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keyword from David can be routed to his smart phone. However, he concerns
about his keywords will be attacked by the other parties such as email gateway.
Therefore, he wants to use a keyword encrypted by a secret key shared between
him and David. However, if using a secret key, they should communicate to
discuss a secret key before sending an email. Moreover, they always need to
change the secret key to ensure the security is warranted. This change not
only a↵ects the efficiency, but also depends on the security of channel which
transmits the secret key.
3. Frank is a user of a public database. He wants to search several keywords in
a database. However, he wouldn’t wish the database provider to know what
he searches. Despite the fact that the database is public, the services provider
prefers Frank not to know the content but his search result. In addition, if
the files in the database are updated by di↵erent people who wish to share the
file to other parties. They might use public key to encrypt their files and then
send to the database server.
The scenarios above outline the searchable encryption requirements: allowing
the search in encrypted data and making leverage between safety and efficiency.
Thus, the question is how we could search the encrypted data with the best possible
efficiency and security. This thesis provides the solutions to these problems by
searchable encryption.
Searchable encryption is a technology that provides capabilities to search encrypted data without decryption key. If the data can be viewed as messages, the
special decryption key, which we call as a trapdoor, can only decrypt a particular
message. Each message is combined with one or a set of keywords. The message will
be encrypted by keywords which could be queried. A trapdoor is a set of keywords
which process the functionalities of decryption key. The message can be decrypted,
while the trapdoor could only be used for keyword matching.
In the first scenario, Alice wants to set a keyword so that the email gateway
is able to redirect selected emails to her smart phone automatically. By using
the public encryption with keyword search, this task could be easily performed.
However, some attackers developed o↵-line keyword guessing attack which tries to
perform brute force attack on limited keyword space. Therefore, we try to develop
a new PEKS to prevent such an attack. We will add identity-based signcryption
into keyword search, so that the message could be authorized from the certificated
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sender. Moreover, the trapdoor is more secure than before.
In the second scenario, Charlie and David desire to use symmetric key to perform
keyword search, since symmetric key encryption can provide a better security level
than the other ones. The intuition of symmetric key encryption, Charlie and David
should share the same secret key. We proposed a construction based on public
key infrastructure. Both Charlie and David will have a private key and public
key. Before they encrypted their keyword or establish a trapdoor, they might use
Diffie-Hellman key exchange to derive the secret key. Therefore, this can be more
confidential and secure than using secret key only. Moreover, it can be extended to
multi-users conveniently.
In the third scenario, Frank would like to retrieval information on a database.
Both Frank’s and database service provider’s privacy need to be guarantied. The
properties are much similar to those of Oblivious Transfer. Therefore, we employ
the OT to perform keyword search. Meanwhile, we improve it with PEKS to achieve
public encryption with oblivious keyword search.

1.3

Organization of the Thesis

The rest of this thesis is organized as follows.
• Chapter 2 presents the cryptographic background knowledge for the thesis.
Firstly, we introduce the cryptographic primitives, including cryptographic

hash function, public-key cryptography etc. Secondly, we define the complexity
assumptions. We briefly describe some knowledge on security proof. Finally,
we review related keyword search protocols.
• Chapter 3 presents a scheme of public key encryption with keyword search in
a designated sender.

• Chapter 4 proposes a scheme of symmetric key encryption with keyword
search.

• Chapter 5 proposes two schemes developed from oblivious transfer and improved to public key encryption with oblivious keyword search.

• Chapter 6 concludes the thesis by highlighting the contributions of this study,
and points out the future work.

1.4. Notation

1.4
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Notation

In this section, we briefly provide the general notations used in our thesis.
Notation
Interpretation
Z

the set of integers

Zq

an integer group of order q

Z⇤q

an integer group of order q without zero

r

2R Z⇤q

uniformly pick a element r from group Z at random

G

a multiplicative cyclic group

Gq

a multiplicative cyclic group of order q

g2G

a generator of a multiplicative cyclic group

|S|

number of element if S is a finite set

A(·)

an algorithm has one input

g

$

G⇤

g is a random generate of group G

A

an algorithm

A(·, ·)

an algorithm has two input

ê

a bilinear map

ri

the index i of element r

a, ..., b

a set of integers from a to b

ê : G ⇥ G ! GT

a bilinear map from ê(g, g) to GT

H

crypto-hash function
exclusive or

Pr[a]

probability of a

✏

a negligible probability

y
y

A(·)

S

y is the output of algorithm A on one input
y is chosen from set S

PPT

probabilistic polynomial time

TTP

trusted third party

e

the base of nature logrithm
Table 1.1: Notations of the thesis

In Table 1.1, we briefly introduce the notations used most in the thesis.

Chapter 2
Background
In this chapter we introduce a concise elucidation of the fundamental knowledge
that will be used throughout this thesis. Firstly, we describe basic concepts of
cryptographic hash function, random oracle and bilinear map. After that we provide
a brief summary about the encryption system and in particular to the public key
encryption. Then we discuss about complexity assumptions. Finally we review some
related work of our research and present some problems.

2.1

Preliminaries

2.1.1

Cryptographic Hash Functions

A hash function is a mathematic function which maps a string with any length to a
string with fix length. The hash function as a efficient cryptographic tool has been
used to check the integrity of data. The formal definition of hash function is as
follows:
Definition 2.1 Hash Function A hash function H is a function: H : {0, 1}⇤ !
{0, 1}k with the following features [Mao03]:

1. Determination. For the same input a, it outputs the same value H(a);
2. Efficiency. Given a a 2 {0, 1}⇤ , H(a) can be computed in polynomial time;
3. Collusion resistance. It is computationally impossible to find a, b 2 {0, 1}⇤ such
that H(a) = H(b);

4. Pre-image resistance. Given a hash value h, it is computationally impossible
to find a x 2 {0, 1}⇤ such that h = H(x).
8
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Random Oracle Model

Random oracle model was first proposed by Bellare and Rogaway [BR93] in 1993.
In this model, a hash function is used, which works as a completely random function
and called random oracle. The random oracle is a deterministic function and has
uniform output. It always outputs the same vale for the same input. In this model,
a simulator maintains a table and simulates all random oracles. For one query, the
simulator checks the table and responds with the value recorded in the list.
Random oracle model is an important tool used to prove the security of cryptographic protocols. Generally speaking, protocols that can be proven to be secure in
random oracle model are more efficient than those in standard model.

2.1.3

Bilinear Pairing

Let G and GT be two multiplicative cyclic groups of order p for some large prime p.
There exists a bilinear map ê : G ⇥ G ! GT . Let g, h be two random generators of
group G. It possesses the properties as follow:

1. Computable: It is efficient to compute ê(g, h) 2 GT .
2. Bilinearity: For all g, h 2 G and random a, b 2 Z, the equation ê(g a , hb ) =
ê(g, h)ab is true.

3. Non-Degeneracy: For all g 2 G, if g is a generator of G, ê(g, g) is a generator
of GT . In another word, if g 6= 0, then ê(g, g) 6= 1.

We can find G and GT which should possess the properties above from Weil pairing
or Tate pairing.

2.1.4

Public Key Encryption

Diffie and Hellman [DH76] first proposed the definition of public key encryption in
1976. In a public key encryption scheme, there are a pair of keys. One is named
as secret key and the other is named as public key. Notably, given the public key,
it is impossible to compute the secret key. The distinctive feature of public key
encryption is that, when a sender wants to send a message to a receiver, he can
encrypt it under the receiver’s public key directly without any previous interaction
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to share a secret key. After receiving the ciphertext from the sender, the receiver
can use his secret key to decrypt it and obtain the original message.
The formal definition for public key encryption is as follows:
Definition 2.2 A public key encryption scheme comprise of three algorithms:
• SysPara(k) ! (sk, pk). Taking as input a security parameter k, this algorithm
outputs a pair of keys (sk, pk), where sk is the secret key and pk is the corresponding public key.
• Enc(pk, m) ! C. Taking as input the public key pk and a message m, this
algorithm outputs a ciphertext C.

• Dec(sk, C) ! m. Taking as input the secret key and the ciphertext, this
algorithm outputs the message m.

We say that a public key encryption scheme is correct, if
2

6
Pr 6
4 De(sk, C) ! m

SysGen(k) ! (sk, pk)
En(pk, m) ! C

3

7
7=1
5

There are some famous public key encryption schemes: RSA encryption [RSA78],
ElGmagal encryption [ElG85] and Cramer-Shoup encryption [CS98].

2.1.5

Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange

Diffie and Hellman [DH76] Proposed a key exchange scheme which can be used by
two entities to set a secure channel. The scheme is described as follows:
• SysPara(k). Two entities Alice and Bob generate their key pair (xA , YA ) and
A

(xB , YB ), respectively, where YA = g x and YB = g xB .

• Interaction. Alice sends her public key YA to Bob. Bob sends YB to Alice.
• KeyGen.
1. Alice uses her secret key xA to compute K = YBxA ;
2. Bob uses his secret key xB to compute K = YAxB .
The key for Alice and Bob is K = YBxA = YAxB = g xA xB .
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2.2

Complexity Assumptions

2.2.1

Discrete Logarithm Problem

Discrete logarithm problem [COS86] is one of the basic assumption in cryptography.
Definition 2.3 Discrete Logarithm Problem. Suppose that G is a cyclic group and g
is a generator in G. Given y 2 G, the problem is to compute a x such that y = g x .
Definition 2.4 Discrete Logarithm Assumption Suppose that G is a cyclic group and
g is a generator in G. Given a value y 2 G, if no PPT algorithm can compute a x
such that y = g x with advantage

P r[y = g x : x

2.2.2

A(G, g, y)]

✏.

Decisional Diffie-Hellman Assumption

Definition 2.5 Let G be multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p. g, u are random generators in G, a, b are random elements in Z⇤p . Given g, g a , g b , u as input,
a

there is little help to output whether g b = u or not.
a

We define an algorithm A that can output g b = u with advantage ✏ in solving

DDH if

Pr[g

R

Pr[z

G, a, b
R

R

a

Z⇤p : A(g, g a , g b , g b ) = 1]

G : A(g, g a , g b , u) = 1]

✏

We say that an algorithm A (t, ✏) has probability ✏ to solve DDH in G if the

running time at most t.

2.2.3

Divisible Computation Diffie-Hellman Assumption

Divisible Computation Diffie-Hellman (DCDH) assumption which is mentioned in
[BDZ03].
Definition 2.6 (DCDH) Let G be multiplicative group of prime order p. g is a
random generator in G, a, b are random elements in Z⇤p . Given g, g a , g b as input,
a

there is little help to output g b .
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a

We define an algorithm A that outputs g b has advantage ✏ in solving DCDH if
Pr[g

R

G, a, b

R

a

Z⇤p : g b

A(g, g a , g b )]

✏

We say that an algorithm A (t, ✏) has probability ✏ to solve DCDH in G if the

running time at most t.

2.2.4

Gap Diffie-Hellman Problem

Gap Diffie-Hellman (GDH) problem which is introduced by Okamoto and Pointcheval [OP01].
Definition 2.7 (GDH) Let G be multiplicative group of prime order p. g is a
random generator in G, a, b, c are random elements in Z⇤p . The Gap Diffie-Hellman
problem is stated as follows:
1. Computation Diffie-Hellman Problem (CDHP). Given (g, g a , g b ), compute g ab .
2. Decisional Diffie-Hellman Problem (DDHP). Given (g, g a , g b , g c ), decide whether
c = ab in Zp .
We call G is a Gap Diffie-Hellman Group where DDHP can be solved in polynomial
time and there is no probabilistic algorithm can solve CDHP in polynomial time.

2.2.5

Decision Linear Diffie-Hellman Assumption

The security of our system is based on complexity assumptions called Decision Linear Diffie-Hellman (DLDH) assumption which is introduced by Boneh, Boyen and
Shacham [BBS04],
Definition 2.8 (DLDH) Let G be multiplicative group of prime order p. u1 , u2 , u3
are random generators in G, a, b, c are random elements in Z⇤p . Given u1 , u2 , u3 , ua1 , ub2 ,
uc3 2 G as input, there is little help to output whether a + b = c or not.
One can easily show that an algorithm that solves DLDH problem in G can also
solve DDH problem. However, the converse is believed to be false. We define an
algorithm A that outputs c = a + b has advantage ✏ in solving DLDH if
Pr[u1 , u2 , u3

R

G, a, b

Pr[u1 , u2 , u3 , ⌘

R

R

Z⇤p : A(u1 , u2 , u3 , ua1 , ub2 , ua+b
3 ) = 1]

G, a, b

R

Z⇤p : A(u1 , u2 , u3 , ua1 , ub2 , ⌘) = 1]

✏

We say that an algorithm A (t, ✏) has probability ✏ to solve DLDH in G if the

running time at most t.

2.3. Related Works

2.2.6

13

Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Assumption

Definition 2.9 Let G be multiplicative group of prime order p. g is a random
generator in G, a, b, c are random elements in Z⇤p . ê is a bilinear map from G to GT
Given g, g a , g b , g c as input, there is little help to output ê(g, g)abc .
We define an algorithm A that outputs ê(g, g)abc = ê(g, g)z has advantage ✏ in

solving BDH if

R

Pr[g

R

G, a, b, c

Z⇤p : ê(g, g)abc

A(g, g a , g b , g c )]

✏

We say that an algorithm A (t, ✏) has probability ✏ to solve BDH in G if the

running time at most t.

Definition 2.10 Let G be multiplicative cyclic group of prime order p. g is a random generator in G, V is a random element in GT , a, b, c are random elements in
1

Z⇤p . ê is a bilinear map from G to GT . Given g, g a , g b , g c , V as input, there is little
ab

help to output whether ê(g, g) c = V or not.
ab

We define an algorithm A that can output ê(g, g) c = ê(g, g)z with advantage ✏

in solving DBDH if
Pr[g

R

Pr[g

G, a, b, c
R

R

G, a, b, c

1

ab

Z⇤p : A(g, g a , g b , g c , ê(g, g) c ) = 1]

R

Z⇤p , V

R

1

GT : A(g, g a , g b , g c , V ) = 1]

✏

We say that an algorithm A (t, ✏) has probability ✏ to solve DBDH in G if the

running time at most t.

2.3
2.3.1

Related Works
Oblivious Transfer

Before the Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search, Oblivious Transfer (OT )
was always being considered as the best way to construct a security communication
channel between sender and receiver. Since the property of OT is very suitable for
conducting keyword search, sender knows nothing about the receiver’s choices, and
receiver can not obtain extra information except his choices. Therefore, Ogata and
Kurosawa proposed an oblivious keyword search scheme based on OT [OK04]. Prior
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to introducing Ogata and Kusosawa’s scheme, we will explain another OT scheme ,
in order to allow readers to have a preliminary knowledge about OT .
Chu and Tzeng proposed two efficient oblivious transfer schemes with adaptive
and non-adaptive queries [CT05]. In their scheme, the sender commits all data to
receiver firstly, which are random numbers from the receivers’ perspective. Then, the
receiver makes queries to sender and sender responds by the corresponding secret
keys of his choices. We should notice that these keys can only decrypt the files
the receiver has chosen. For the other files, the result of receiver’s calculation is
just like random numbers. Furthermore, one of their schemes can be extended to
adaptive OT . Although the receiver can send the queries one by one adaptively, the
scheme supplies the same security as the non-adaptive one. Therefore, this property
extremely suits keyword search. Additionally, it also suits searching in a public
database. For that reason, we have thought that using accumulator to integrate
the search item, and it fulfills the property of pay-as-you-use in cloud computing.
The author also gives some comparisons between Mu’s [MZV02], Naor’s [NP99b],
Ogata’s [OK04] schemes and themselves’, and their schemes have more advantages
than the others on efficiency and confidentiality. Thus, our second application is
based on it.
Back to Ogata and Kurosawa’s scheme, they firstly proposed the concept of
oblivious transfer. Compared with traditional OT , their proposal not only uses
keyword instead of the index to conduct keyword search, but also utilizes blind
signature to process keyword extract, which illuminated the following researchers to
perform keyword extract in the similar way [CKRS09].
Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation (OPE) is first proposed in 1999 [NP99a, NP06],
which is a variant of OT . Instead of committing all the data to the receiver, the
sender inputs a polynomial function such as P() . Receiver will input a value such
as ↵. When ↵ is the root of P() , the function P(↵) will return the result the receiver
want to obtain. Otherwise, the receiver gets nothing from sender since the result
will be like a random number. There are many applications for OPE, such as
mutually authenticated key exchange, private comparison of data. Similarly, OPE
can be extended to keyword search. Freedman has proposed a keyword search
scheme with oblivious pseudorandom functions based on OPE [FIPR05]. They use
a pseudorandom function to perform OPE, then employ it to compute P()

M

where M is the message and the root is keyword which will make P() equals to zero.
Since the pseudorandom function is published, the user can execute keyword search
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by himself. On the other hand, the authors haven’t supply such a pseudorandom
function, though it inherit the OT ’s property of protect both sender’s and receiver’s
privacy. Therefore the method is worth to continue thinking about. Similarly,
[GSW04, ZB07] utilized OPE to perform oblivious transfer as well.

2.3.2

Private Information Retrieval

As we have mentioned previously, Private Information Retrieval (PIR) is a protocol
to protect the privacy of receiver rather than sender in 1995 [CKGS98]. It seems that
the security is weaker than oblivious transfer(OT), but the fact is just the opposite.
PIR provides the security between one receiver and multiple senders. In another
word, a receiver can search on k (k > 2) databases without revealing any information under PIR protocol. Then they continued to extend to information retrieval
by keywords [CGN97]. The definition is much more approached to the concept of
searching in the cloud. However, to achieve this, they should store replicated copies
on di↵erent database. In addition, Ostrovsky [OS97] extended it private information storage, in which people can read and write on public database confidentially.
Moreover, Naor [NP00] proposed another OT scheme to achieve similar results.
In spite of PIR allowing users to search information privately, it is still inefficient
since the database server might send the user all data where only some of them are
results. To avoid this, by using of Bloom filters [Blo70], Boneh [BKOI07] brought
public key encryption into PIR and achieved that the total communication linear to
n. However, PIR doesn’t protect the sender’s privacy.

2.3.3

Public Encryption with Keyword Search

The Public Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) was proposed in 2004 [BCOP04].
The scheme is based on bilinear pairing and its security is based on Bilinear DiffieHellman assumption. Generally speaking, the scheme encrypts the email body first.
Then keywords should be encrypted by using receiver’s public key. At the same time,
the receiver will create a trapdoor utilizing his private key and send the trapdoor to
the email gateway. The gateway will use the trapdoor to test the ciphertext whether
it contains a certain keyword and then route it to corresponding destination. Figure
2.1 shows how the PEKS works.
Public key encryption with conjunctive filed keyword search was proposed by
Park et al. [PKL05]. In their filed keyword definition, keywords should be classified
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Figure 2.1: Public key Encryption with Keyword Search

in di↵erent areas in order to avoid one keyword located in the di↵erent fields. For
example, the content of email from “Bob” to “Alice” is related to “lunch”. The three
keywords should be arranged to the field “From”, “To” and “Subject”. Therefore,
their scheme can perform conjunctive keyword search accurately. Hwang [HL07] and
Zhang [ZZ11] also gave other ways to construct public encryption with conjunctive
keyword search seperately. As the reason that there is no specific scheme to perform the encryption of email body, Baek [BSNS06] proposed public key encryption
(Elgamal) with PEKS to refine the original scheme. In addition, they extend their
scheme to multi-user setting. Gu [GZP08] has proposed an efficient scheme that
provides no pairing operations involved in encryption.
However, the argument on PEKS never stops since it was proposed. Beak
[BSNS05] pointed out that there must be a secure channel such as Secure Socket
Layer (SSL) between receiver and email gateway, otherwise it cannot be secure. In
addition, there is no secure channel in some special situation such as GPRS network. Therefore they proposed a secure channel free PEKS scheme by constructing
a crypto secure channel between sender and email gateway. Byun et al. and Yau et
al. proposed o↵-line keyword guessing attack separately [BRPL06, YHG08]. In their
views, the keywords are chosen from smaller space than the password. Therefore
the scheme is more vulnerable to resist from keyword guessing attack. Additionally, Jeong [JKHL09] gave the proof that constructing PEKS scheme under o✏ine
keyword guessing attack is impossible.
Abdalla [ABC+ 05] first suggested that the PEKS is a weak consistent scheme,
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since the hash value of keyword is not statistical consistent resistent. Therefore,
in order to preserve consistency, they add session key in PEKS and verify all four
elements of ciphertext. Although it provides the consistency, it sacrifices the computing efficiency and increases the length of ciphertext. They also advised that
any anonymous Identity Based Encryption (IBE) scheme could be transformed to a
consistent PEKS scheme. Compared with the previous contribution, the author proposed public key encryption with temporary keyword search by allowing the testing
of a keyword across multiple time periods using a single temporary trapdoor for one
of the intervals. This is a significant improvement that solves the problem that the
trapdoor can be used maliciously all the time. Furthermore, they suggest combining
IBE with PEKS to perform identity based encryption with keyword search.
Similarly with Abdalla, Camenisch [CKRS09] suggested using anonymous IBE
to achieve public key encryption with oblivious keyword search. From their opinions,
PEKS is just like IBE scheme. The receiver should apply trapdoors from a third
trusted party (TTP) who keeps the master key. Thus, they designed a blind keyword
extraction protocol to protect the receiver’s privacy. Their scheme is suitable for
search on encrypted data.

2.3.4

Other Searchable Encryption

Besides oblivious transfer, private information retrieval and public encryption with
keyword search (PEKS), there are still some other techniques can perform keyword
search. Freedman [FNP04] proposed a scheme to achieve keyword search by using
homomorphic encryption. Considered the keywords from sender and receiver as two
sets, the search progress can be presented in private match through a homomorphic
algorithm without reveal anything to opponent. Bellare et al. [BBO06] presented a
efficient searchable encryption that allowed a group member to submit data for one
or all members in the group. The motivation looks a bit like what we would like
to achieve, though the techniques are thoroughly di↵erent. They combine public
key encryption with hash function together, making the ciphertext confidential to
database server, but allows the database server to mark on it. When the data is
being searched, the server can only identify the index of the encrypted data without
knowing anything else. Nevertheless, we think it can not be consistent resistant
because of the injective method they employed.
In another area, searchable symmetric encryption also fascinates researchers

2.3. Related Works

18

[CGKO06, SWP00]. Actually, they inherit the form of PEKS. The progress contains
keywords encryption, trapdoors creation and tests. Di↵erent from PEKS, symmetric
encryption adopted the method like what Bellare’s scheme [BBO06]. In that case,
database server can reorder and conduct searching operation on encrypted data.
That’s the reason why we don’t employ the Bellare’s scheme.

2.3.5

Broadcast Encryption

Broadcast encryption was first proposed by Fiat [FN94], that provides a method
for the qualified people to decrypt message that has been sent to all. The application includes TV subscription services, and DVD content protection etc. In Fiat’s
scheme, binary tree is utilized to present di↵erence between privileged and revoked
member. It guarantees the security against a collusion of t users. Later, an efficient full collusion resistent scheme was proposed by Naor [NNL01], but only can
be performed with a small set of revoked member. Further, Dodis [DF03] extended
the conception to a large set, and ensured the security to revoke any numbers users
smaller than n. However, the running time increased dramatically.
Boneh, Gentry and Waters [BGW05] showed two collusion resistant schemes
that are secure against any colluded revoked user. Constant and shorter ciphertext
is another advantage of their schemes. Instead of managing the users’ identity by
binary tree, they employ adding or reducing group elements to perform authority
and revocation. A part of cipher text consist of the product of users’ public keys.
Then, only the users whose public keys are in the ciphertext can decrypt message by
their private keys. Broadcast encryption aims to restrict qualification to decrypt the
message. Conversely, the message only from the qualified people can be searched.
It can prevent the trapdoor to be malicious tested efficiently.

2.3.6

Accumulator and Batch Verification

Although some searchable scheme can supply keyword search by single keywords,
there is still no any scheme o↵ering a search scheme that can integrate searchable
encryptions or test progresses in one element or one time.
The concept of crypto-accumulator was firstly proposed by Benaloh [BdM93]
in 1993, which combines two or more values into one element with the constant
size. They supposed to use one way hash functions to perform accumulator, which
satisfies quasi-communicative property. Their scheme is based on RSA assumption
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and the accumulator only can be computed by central authority. Later, Camenisch
[CL02] presented the conception with the dynamic accumulator that allows someone
to add and delete a value dynamically. Nguyen [Ngu05] developed a new scheme
based on bilinear pairing, though it has been proved that their scheme was not
collision resistant [TZL+ 08]. Camenisch [CKS09] gave an efficient and suitable one.
Nevertheless, all the keywords have been encrypted before storing on the database.
It is hard to evaluate an encrypted data whether in the accumulator. It is indeed
an interesting open problem.
Batch verification was firstly presented by Fiat [Fia89] in 1989. At that time, he
presented this concept to reduce the individual private operations of RSA scheme. In
1995, Yen brought the batch verification in digital signature [YL95]. Batch verification attracts people’s eye all the time, and supplies that di↵erent signer on di↵erent
message can be verified very quickly[CHP07]. Moreover, it is suitable for the aim of
keyword search.

Chapter 3
Public key encryption with keyword
search in designated sender
The public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme was proposed by
Boneh, Di Crescenzo, Ostrovsky and Persiano[BCOP04], which enables one to search
the encrypted keywords without revealing the keywords and content. Since the
PEKS was proposed, it attracts numerous researchers’ attention. PEKS was original applied in the e-mail system which can enable gateway test whether an email
contains a certain keyword. However, some researcher has proposed perform o✏ine
keyword attack to guess the keyword due to that the keyword space is limited. Our
schemes allow one to search the encrypted keywords with an encrypted identity and
keyword. One of the obvious answers is that the sender can combine his signature
with the ciphertext. Nevertheless, the scheme we proposed combines the signature
and encryption together and reduces the size of ciphertext. Therefore, though the
server and other outside attacker can guess the keyword the receiver wants to search,
they still could not forge the encrypted message or trapdoor to perform further attacks.

3.1

Introduction

The public key encryption with keyword search (PEKS) scheme was proposed by
Boneh et al. [BCOP04]. They realize the following scenario: suppose Alice is an
email user. Due to the development of information technology, Alice can read her
email on several devices: desktop, laptop, smart phone, iPad, etc. For convenience,
she can set some keywords to her email gateway, so that only the message contain
these keywords can be directed to her smart phone. Others will be sent to her
desktop or laptop later. For instance, Bob want to send two emails to Alice with the
keywords “urgent” and “lunch” respectively and has encrypted using Alice’s public
20
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key. Alice has set the gateway that only emails containing the keyword “urgent” will
be sent to her smart phone. Therefore, the former letter will be sent to smart phone
and latter will be sent to desktop to be read later. In this scenario, Alice will send a
trapdoor to gateway to perform the setting. Nevertheless, the trapdoor isn’t secure
enough to prevent the malicious attack. For example, the one who acquires the
trapdoor in some way can conduct o✏ine attack to the trapdoor [YHG08]. Roughly
speaking, the attack could use brute force to guess the trapdoor, since the keywords
space is limited. Once he breaks down the trapdoor, he can send junk mail to Alice
with the keywords which are acquired from the cracked trapdoor. Moreover, if the
gateway acquires the cracked trapdoor, the message sent in an encrypted form is
meaningless for Alice.
In short, the PEKS proposed a method that enables the gateway server to search
the senders’ email keywords by using the receivers’ trapdoor. We extend the original scheme with identity based signature scheme to confirm the email’s sender. Our
scheme not only filters the keyword and sender, but also requires senders’ authentication.
Along with the development of information technology, the keyword search is
always an interesting issue that attracts people’s eyes. Before the public encryption with keyword search, there was private information retrieval (PIR) [CKGS98],
oblivious transfer (OT) [Rab81] and searchable symmetric encryption applied on
the database data. In the literature, the PIR was introduced by Chor, Goldreich,
Kushilevitz and Sudan in 1995, which allows a person search on a database without revealing the items he has searched. However, the PIR doesn’t protect the
database’s privacy. In 2002, Ogata and Kurosawa proposed an oblivious keyword
search scheme that uses OT into keyword search. The aim of the scheme is to protect
both searcher and database’s privacy [OK04]. The searcher doesn’t reveal any information to database server, and the database server doesn’t reveal any information
except the user’s search item. Nevertheless, it costs the communication efficiency.
Mike Freedman et al. proposed a keyword search scheme based on a pseudo-random
function, it improves from both PIR and OT and achieves more efficient on communication [FIPR05]. It achieves search numbers of keyword in a single trapdoor.
However the PEKS performs public key encryption and reduces extra communications between sender and keyword search performer for particular keyword, there
are still some parts vulnerable in the scheme. The o✏ine attack is a significant
problem to PEKS. Therefore, many researchers have focused on this issue. Abdalla,
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Bellare, Catalano and Kiltz proposed a public encryption with temporary keyword
search to address this problem [ABC+ 05]. They use the technique of hierarchical
identity based encryption to perform the temporary keyword search. In their opinion, they distribute trapdoors in di↵erent time interval. Hence, even though one of
the trapdoors has been broken down, Other trapdoors can be still used safely. Baek,
Safavi-Naini and Susilo has proposed several schemes [BSNS05][BSNS06]. One of
them enables receiver sends trapdoor without a security channel, others extends
PEKS against chosen ciphertext attack and also extends PEKS to multi-receiver.
Moreover, Park et al. [PKL05] and Hwang et al. [HL07] extends PEKS to search
conjunctive keywords respectively.

3.1.1

Contributions of This Chapter

We concern the problem of the fact that PEKS is vulnerable by the o✏ine attack
[YHG08]. Although some people have proposed solutions, we address the problem
in another way, but no less security. The target of our scheme is that receiver can
search the encrypted keyword in a list which only includes the people he trusts and
he wants. Therefore, the o✏ine attack can not be conducted on our scheme. At the
same time, in our scheme, the senders will not reveal any information about their
identities and keywords. The receivers will not reveal their targets and searched
keywords. Furthermore, we think our scheme can be used in cloud computing to
perform the keyword search.
This chapter is structured as follows. We describe the keyword search in designated sender scheme and security notion in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, we
will give the detail of the scheme and the security proof. Some applications will be
showed in section 4 and we will give conclusion in Section 5.

3.2

General Structure

We begin by formally defining public key encryption with keyword search in designate senders. There are three parties in our public key encryption in designated
sender (PEKSDS) scheme: sender, receiver and server. The purpose of PEKSDS is
constructing a secure searchable system which enables receiver only search among
the senders he trusts. Both outside sender and server have no capabilities to forge
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an encryption that receiver trusts and the encryption is secure against indistinguishable chosen keyword attack.
Next, we will precisely define the work procedure. Firstly, the sender will send
the encrypted files with keywords W1 , ..., Wk , and his identity in the ciphertext. The
message will be sent as follows:
⇥
⇤
EApub [msg], PEKSDS(Apub , dID , W1 , ), ..., PEKSDS(Apub , dID , Wk )

where Apub is receiver ’s public key, dID is sender ’s secret key, msg is the message
body, PEKSDS is the scheme we will discuss below. Then, the receiver will send
a secret trapdoor TW to server which includes the keywords and sender ’s identity.
Finally, the server will locate the message that contains the certain keywords from
the designate sender and send the encrypted message back to the receiver.
At the end of this section, we will state the complexity assumption needed for
our proof of security.

3.2.1

Definition of PEKSDS

Definition 3.1 (PEKSDS) A public encryption with keyword search in designated
senders is made of six randomized algorithms:

sp.

SysPara(k): Taking a security parameter k 2 N, it generates a system parameters
KeyGenReceiver (sp): Taking system parameters sp as input, it generates receiver ’s

key pair Apriv /Apub .
KeyGenPKG (sp): Taking system parameters sp as input, it generates a master
secret key M sk and public key Ppub for all senders.
KeyGenSender (sp): Taking system parameters sp and master key M sk as input, it
generates sender ’s secret key dID according to the sender ’s ID.
Encryption(Apub , dID , W ): Taking Apub and sender ’s secret key dID , it produces
a searchable encryption of W .
Trapdoor(Apriv , W, ID): Taking receiver ’s private key, a sender ’s identity ID,
and keyword W as input, receiver produces a trapdoor TW .
Test(TW , Ppub , Enc): Given the searchable encryption Enc(Apub , dID , W ), trapdoor TW (Apriv , W 0 , ID) and Ppub . Output ‘yes’ while both W = W 0 and sender is
designated, or ‘no’ otherwise.
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Security Model

We define PEKSDS is semantically secure against a static adversary. The encryption possess security we called “indistinguishability against chosen keyword and
identity attack” (IND-CIA-CKA), “unforgeability against chosen identity attack”
(UF-CIA) and “unforgeability against chosen Trapdoor attack” (UF-CTA). Let algorithm Ai (i = 1, 2, 3) be an attacker who wants to attack PEKSDS system bounded

by polynomial time t. To illustrate security for PEKSDS, we define three games
between Ai and a challenger as follows:
Game 1: A1 aims to distinguish PEKSDS by chosen keyword and identity attack.
Setup & KeyGen: The challenger runs SysPara(k) to obtain system parameters
and generate key pairs Apub /Apriv and Ppub /M sk separately. Then sends Apub and
Ppub to A1 .
Trapdoor query phase 1: A1 adaptively issues queries q1 , ..., qm for the trapdoor

TW for keywords Wi 2 {0, 1}⇤ and IDi 2 {0, 1}⇤ , where 1  i  m. The challenger
responds with TW (Apriv , Wi , IDi ) to A1 .

Challenge: A1 sends two pairs (W0 , ID0 ) and (W1 , ID1 ) to challenger on which

it wishes to be challenged on. Next, the challenger picks a random

2 {0, 1}. It

sets Enc = Enc(Apub , dID , W ) and gives it A1 . The only requirement is that A1
hasn’t queried pair (W0 , ID0 ) and (W1 , ID1 ) for trapdoor.

Trapdoor query phase 2: A1 continues to adaptively issue pairs (Wi , IDi ) for

trapdoor. The only constraint is that Wi 6= W0 , W1 and IDi 6= ID0 , ID1 . The
challenger responds the same as in phase 1.
Guess: Algorithm A1 outputs its guess

=

0

0

.

2 {0, 1} for

0

and wins the game if

We refer to such an adversary A1 as IND-CIA-CKA adversary. We defined the

advantage of A1 is attacking the scheme as

AdvA1 = Pr[ =

0

]

1
2

.
Game 2: A2 aims to forge a PEKSDS to act as a sender who receiver trusts. Let
A2 be an attacker who can obtain the keyword W which receiver wants to search.
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Setup & KeyGen: The challenger runs SysPara(k) to obtain system parameters
and generate key pairs Apub /Apriv and Ppub /senders’ master key separately. Then
sends Apub and Ppub to A2 .
Encryption Query: To forge the sender who receiver trusts, A2 issues encryption

queries q1 , ..., qm of keyword Wi and IDi , where 1  i  m. The challenger responds
with Enc(Apub , dIDi , Wi ).

Forgery: A2 announces an identity he wants to forgery, and outputs an Enc(Apub ,

dID , W ) where W is the keyword it intends to forge. A2 wins the game if Enc(Apub ,
dID , W ) is valid encryption.

We refer to such an adversary A2 as UF-CIA adversary. We defined the advan-

tage of A2 is attacking the scheme as

AdvA2 = |Pr[V erif y(P EKSDS)] = valid|
Game 3: A3 aims to forge a trapdoor.
Setup & KeyGen: The challenger runs SysPara(k) to obtain system parameters
and generate key pairs Apub /Apriv . Then sends Apub to A3 .
Trapdoor Query: A3 adaptively issues queries q1 , ..., qm for keywords Wi and IDi ,

where 1  i  m. The challenger responds with the TW (Apriv , Wi , IDi ) to A3 .

Forgery: A3 outputs a forged trapdoor TW (Apriv , W, ID). A3 wins the game if

(Apriv , W, ID) is valid trapdoor.

We refer to such an adversary A3 as UF-CTA adversary. We defined the advan-

tage of A3 is attacking the scheme as

AdvA3 = |Pr[V erif y(T rapdoor)] = valid|
Definition 3.2 Our PEKS scheme is (t, q, ✏)-semantically secure, if there exists no
adversary Ai , (i 2 1, 2, 3), who runs in at most t time and queries at most q times,
the probability at least ✏.

3.3
3.3.1

Construction
PEKSDS System

The PEKSDS scheme consists of the following algorithm:
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SysPara: The algorithm chooses two multiplicative cyclic groups G, GT of prime
order p for some large prime number to construct a bilinear map ê: G ⇥ G !
GT . Then, it picks a random generator g 2 G. We will need two hash func-

tions H1 : {0, 1}⇤ ! G and H2 : {0, 1}⇤ ! G. The system parameters are
(G, GT , p, ê, g, H1 , H2 ).

KeyGenReceiver : The algorithm picks a random ↵ 2 Z⇤p , it computes g ↵ = h 2 G.

(g, h) is published as receiver ’s public key. ↵ is kept by receiver as private key.

KeyGenPKG : The algorithm picks a random s 2 Z⇤p , s is set as master secret key

M sk. It computes g s 2 G, g s is published as Ppub .

KeyGenSender : The secret key dID for individual sender is set as H2 (ID)s .
Encryption: Sender picks a random number r 2 Z⇤p , uses his secret key H2 (ID)s ,

receiver ’s public key h, and keyword W , to compute

(C1 , C2 ) = (H2 (ID)s · H1 (W )r , hr ) 2 G2
and transfers (C1 , C2 ) to the server.
Trapdoor: Receiver picks a random t 2 Z⇤p , uses his private key ↵ and sender ’s

identity ID to compute:

T1 , T2 , T3 ) = (H1 (W 0 )t/↵ , H2 (ID)t , g t 2 G3
and sends (T1 , T2 , T3 ) to the server.
Test: Then, the server will search the keyword user by user according to Ppub
s

(g ), and test:
ê(C1 , T3 ) = ê(T2 , C3 ) · ê(T1 , C2 )
If the result is true, return the content corresponding to the keyword. Else, nothing.
Correctness: We first verify that the system is correct, namely that the test
algorithm works correctly. Server computes as:
ê(C1 , T3 )
= ê(H2 (ID)s · H1 (W )r , g t )

= ê(H2 (ID)s , g t ) · ê(H1 (W )r , g t )

= ê(H2 (ID)t , g s ) · ê(H1 (W )r/↵ , ht )
= ê(H2 (ID)t , g s ) · ê(H1 (W )t/↵ , hr )
= ê(T2 , C3 ) · ê(T1 , C2 )
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Security Analysis

We now present the security proof of our PEKSDS scheme.
Theorem 3.1 Let G be a multiplicative bilinear group of prime order p. Our system is (t,✏,qT , qH2 ) semantically secure against indistinguishable chosen keyword and
identity attack (IND-CIA-CKA) assuming the (t,✏,qT , qH2 )-DLDH assumption holds
in G.
Proof: Let algorithm A1 be an attacker bounded in a polynomial time t, who has
advantage ✏ in breaking PEKSDS. A1 can perform at most qT trapdoor queries, qH1 ,

qH2 hash function queries to H1 and H2 separately. Let B be an algorithm who aims
to solve DLDH problem with the probability at least ✏0 =

✏
,
e 2 qT q H 2

and its running

time is similar to A1 . Thus, if DLDH problem holds in G, then ✏0 is a negligible
function. Consequently, ✏ is a negligible probability for A1 to break the PEKSDS
scheme.

Let u1 , u2 , u3 be generators of G. Algorithm B is given u1 , u2 , u3 , ua1 , ub2 , ⌘ 2 G as

input, to determine whether ⌘ equals to ua+b
or a random element in G. B proceeds
3
as follows:

Setup & KeyGen: Algorithm B starts by setting g = u1 to be the system parameter.

To simulate receiver, algorithm B sets h = u2 . In another word, (g, h) is receiver ’s

public key, and ↵ where h = g ↵ is set to be receiver’s secret key. On the other hand,
B sets s = a to be master secret key M sk. Therefore, Ppub is g s where g s = ua1 and
sender’ s secret key dID is H2 (ID)a . Finally, B gives (u1 , u2 , ua1 ) to the adversary
A1 .

H1 , H2 -queries: At any time, A1 can issue at most qH1 and qH2 queries to random

oracles H1 and H2 separately. B simulates the responds. Two lists hWi , hi , xi , c1i i
and hIDi , fi , yi , c2i i are maintained by B as the random oracle queries. The former

one is called H1 list and the later one is H2 list. They are empty at the beginning.
The random oracle query procedure is as follows:
H1 queries:
• When receive a query for keyword Wi , B responds as H1 (Wi ) = hi 2 G1 if Wi
is already in H1 list.
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• Otherwise, B will flip a coin c1i 2 {0, 1} with Pr[c1i = 0] =
(

If c1i = 0,
If c1i = 1,

hi = ux3 i 2 G,

hi = ux2 i 2 G,

1.

xi 2R Z⇤p
xi 2R Z⇤p

• At last, B adds hIDi , hi , xi , c1i i to H1 list, then sends the value hi to adversary
A1 as the result of random oracle query.

H2 queries:
• When receive a query for identity IDi , B responds as H2 (ID) = fi 2 G, if
IDi is already in H2 list.

• Otherwise, B will flip a coin c2i 2 {0, 1} with Pr[c2i = 0] =
(

If c2i = 0,
If c2i = 1,

fi = uy3i 2 G,
fi = uy1i 2 G,

2.

yi 2R Z⇤p
yi 2R Z⇤p

• At last, B adds hIDi , fi , yi , c2i i to H2 list, then sends the value fi to adversary
A1 as the result of random oracle query.

Trapdoor query phase 1: A1 can choose a keyword Wi and an identity IDi to B to
perform trapdoor queries. B will responds as follows:

1. For every trapdoor query, the algorithm above will be run by B to derive H1

and H2 list such as hWi , hi , xi , c1i i and hIDi , fi , yi , c2i i. If c1i = 0 or c2i = 0,
then B claims failure and terminates.

2. Otherwise, B will obtain hi = ux2 i and fi = uy1i . In addition, it randomly picks
t 2 Z⇤p . Then, we can simulate the trapdoor as:

(Ti1 , Ti2 , Ti3 ) = (ux1 i t , uy1i t , ut1 )
Since h = g ↵ , we have:
x t/↵

ux1 i t = g xi t = hxi t/↵ = u2 i
uy1i t = fit = H2 (IDi )t
ut1 = g t

t/↵

= hi

= H1 (Wi )t/↵
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Challenge: Eventually algorithm A1 produces two pairs of keywords and identities

hW0 , ID0 i and hW1 , ID1 i that it wishes to be challenged on. The only requirement is

that pairs hW0 , ID0 i, hW1 , ID1 i haven’t been queried before. Algorithm B generates
the challenge PEKSDS as follows:

1. Algorithm B runs the above algorithm for responding to H1 -queries and H2 queries twice. If neither of pair (c10 , c20 ) and (c11 , c21 ) both equal 0, then B
claims failure and terminates.

2. Otherwise, at least one of the pair (c10 , c20 ) and (c11 , c21 ) both equal to 0.
B picks i 2 {0, 1} randomly, and sets pair (W , ID ) = (Wi , IDi ), where
both (c1i , c2i ) equal to 0. Note, if only one pair (c1i , c2i ) equals to 0, there is

no randomized. Let hWi , hi , xi , c1i i and hIDi , fi , yi , c2i i be the corresponding
tuples on the H1 -list and H2 -list separately.
3. Algorithm B computes z =

yi
.
xi

In another form, xi =

yi
.
z

and responds with the challenge PEKS as:

Then B sets r = bz

(C1 , C2 ) = (⌘ yi , ubz
2 )
If ⌘ = ua+b
3 , the following equation is true:
(a+b)yi

⌘ yi = u 3

yi

bz

byi
yi a
yi a
xi bz
i
z
= uay
3 · u3 = (u3 ) · (u3 ) = (u3 ) · (u3 )

s
r
= fia · hbz
i = H2 (ID) · H1 (W )

bz
r
ubz
2 = h = h

yi
If ⌘ 6= ua+b
is only a random element in G.
3 , C1 = ⌘

Trapdoor query phase2: A1 can continue to issue trapdoor queries for keywords Wi
where Wi 6= W0 , W1 and IDi 6= ID0 , ID1 . B will response as before.
Guess: A1 will guess

0

2 {0, 1} for . If

0

=

it means ⌘ is a random element in G.

, B will output ⌘ = ua+b
3 . Otherwise,

Next, we will explain the probability that B can output the correct answer. The
procedure should not abort during trapdoor queries and challenge phase. As the
result of [BCOP04], we let the probability of coin equals 0 be Pr[ci = 0] =
It should satisfy that the function (1
optimize the value,

opt

=

1
.
qT +1

) qT ·

Therefore

1

.

would have the largest value. To
=

1
,
qH1 +1

2

=

1
.
qH2 +1

Therefore, the

probability that B doesn’t abort during the trapdoor queries phase is (1

1
) q H1
qH1 +1

·
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1
e2

where e is the base of nature logarithm. Subsequently, when

perform oracle queries for pairs (W0 , ID0 ), (W1 , ID1 ), both (c10 , c20 ) and (c11 , c21 )
equal to 1. Algorithm B will abort during challenge phase. The probability is
1
)2
qH1 +1

(1

· (1

1
)2
qH2 +1

 (1

1
)(1
qH1 +1

1
).
qH2 +1

B doesn’t abort until challenge phase is at least
succeeding is

✏
e 2 q H 1 q H2

Moreover, the probability that

1
.
e 2 q H 1 q H2

Hence, the overall of B

as required. Then proof of theorem is completed.

Theorem 3.2 Let G be a multiplicative bilinear group of prime order p. Our system
is (t,✏,qH1 , qH2 ) unforgeable secure against chosen identity attack (UF-CIA) assuming
the (t,✏,qH1 , qH2 )-CDH assumption holds in G.
Proof: Let algorithm A2 be an attacker bounded in a polynomial time t, who

has advantage ✏ in breaking PEKSDS. A2 can perform at most qT trapdoor queries,

qH1 , qH2 hash function queries to H1 and H2 separately. Let B be an algorithm who

aims to solve CDH problem with the probability at most ✏0 , and its running time
is similar to A2 . Thus, if CDH problem holds in G, then ✏0 is a negligible function.
Consequently, ✏ is a negligible probability for A2 to break the PEKSDS scheme.

Let g be a generator of G, a, b be random numbers in Z⇤p . Algorithm B is given

g, g a , g b 2 G as input, and aims to compute g ab . B proceeds as follows:

Setup & KeyGen: Algorithm B starts by setting g to be the system parameter. To

simulate sender, algorithm B sets g s = g a . In another word, g s is Ppub , a is set to be
senders’ master key and sender’ s secret key dID is H2 (ID)a . To simulate receiver,

B picks a generator h 2 G randomly, where h = g ↵ . (g, h) is set to be receiver ’s

public key. ↵ to be set as receiver ’s private key. Finally, B gives (g, h, g a ) to the
adversary A2 .

H1 , H2 -queries: At any time, A2 can issue at most qH1 and qH2 queries to random

oracles H1 and H2 separately. B simulates the responds. Two lists hWi , hi , xi i and
hIDi , fi , yi , ci i is maintained by B as the random oracle queries. The former one is

called H1 list and the later one is H2 list. They are empty at the beginning. The
random oracle query procedures are as follows:
H1 queries: When receive a query for keyword Wi , algorithm B responds as

H1 (W ) = hi 2 G1 if Wi is already in H1 list. Otherwise, randomly pick xi 2 Z⇤p ,
and set hi = hxi . Then B responds H1 query as hi , and adds hWi , hi , xi i to the H1
list.
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H2 queries:
• When receive a query for identity IDi , B responds as H2 (ID) = fi 2 G, if
IDi is already in H2 list.

• Otherwise, B will flip a coin ci , where ci 2 {0, 1} with Pr[ci = 0] = .
(

If ci = 0,
If ci = 1,

fi = g b · g yi 2 G,
fi = g yi 2 G,

yi 2R Z⇤p
yi 2R Z⇤p

• At last, B adds hIDi , fi , yi , ci i to H2 list, then sends the value fi to adversary
A2 as the result of random oracle query.

Encryption Query: A2 can choose a keyword Wi0 and an identity IDi to B to perform
encryption queries. Where the identity is belonged to the sender who receiver trusts.
B will responds as follows:
1. For every encryption query, the algorithm above will be run by B. If ci = 0,
then B claims failure and terminates.

2. Otherwise, B will obtain hi = hxi and fi = g yi . It randomly picks r 2 Z⇤p , and
sets:

(Ci1 , Ci2 ) = (g xi r · g yi a , hr )
and we have:
g xi r · g yi a = fia · hri = H2 (ID)s · H1 (W )r
Forgery: Eventually algorithm A2 announces an identity ID⇤ and a keyword W ⇤

and output the forgery (C1 , C2 ) . We assume that ID⇤ and W ⇤ have been queried
before. Then, if H1 (W ⇤ ) = hi = hxi and H2 (ID⇤ ) = fi = g b · g yi , A2 forge the
encryption as:

(C1 , C2 ) = (hxi r · g ab · g ayi , hr )
Moreover, B can output g ab =

C1
(g a )yi ·(hr )xi

=

hxi r ·g ab ·g ayi
(g a )yi ·(hr )xi

Next, we will explain the probability that B can output the correct answer. The
procedure should not abort during the queries phase. As we already known,
1
.
qH2 +1

(1

=

Therefore, the probability that B doesn’t abort during the queries phase is

1
) q H2
qH2 +1

1
e

where e is the base of nature logarithm. Subsequently, in the

forgery phase, if we want to calculate g ab , we need to find H1 (W ) = hxi , H2 (ID⇤ ) =
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g b · g yi in the H1 and H2 lists seperately. As the result, the probability will be
2/(qH1 + qH2 ). Hence, the overall of B succeeding is

2✏
e(qH1 +qH2 )

as required. Then

proof of theorem is completed.

Theorem 3.3 The trapdoor of our scheme is semantically secure assuming CDH
and DCDH assumption holds in G.
Proof: Assume that A3 is the algorithm who can forge the trapdoor of our PEKSDS
scheme. We describe the reduction by falling into two types of attacks:

1. Given the keyword part of trapdoor, A3 can forge a valid trapdoor which
includes other identity.

2. Given the identity part of trapdoor, A3 can forge a valid trapdoor which
includes other keyword.

In the lemma 1 and lemma 2, we reduce the attacks to solve the CDH assumption
and DCDH assumption respectively. This concludes the security proof of trapdoor
of our PEKSDS scheme.
Lemma 3.4 The trapdoor of our scheme is (t, ✏, qH2 ) semantically secure assuming
(t, ✏, qH2 )-CDH assumption holds in G1 .
Proof: Let algorithm A31 be an attacker bounded in a polynomial time t, who

has advantage ✏ in breaking our PEKS. A31 can perform at most qT trapdoor queries,

qH1 , qH2 hash function queries to H1 and H2 separately. Let B be an algorithm who
aims to solve CDH problem with the probability at most ✏0 , and its running time is
similar to A31 . Thus, if CDH problem holds in G, then ✏0 is a negligible function.
Consequently, ✏ is a negligible probability for A31 to break the new PEKS scheme.

Let g be a generator of G, a, b be random numbers in Z⇤p . Algorithm B is given

g, g a , g b 2 G as input, and aims to compute g ab . B proceeds as follows:

Setup & KeyGen: Algorithm B starts by setting g to be the system parameter. To

simulate receiver, B picks a generater h 2 G randomly, where h = g ↵ . (g, h) is set

to be receiver ’s public key. ↵ to be set as receiver ’s private key. Finally, B gives
(g, h) to the adversary A31 .

H1 , H2 -queries: At any time, A31 can issue at most qH1 and qH2 queries to random

oracles H1 and H2 separately. B simulates the responds. Two lists hWi , hi , xi i and
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hIDi , fi , yi , ci i is maintained by B as the random oracle queries. The former one is

called H1 list and the later one is H2 list. They are empty at the beginning. The
random oracle query procedures are as follows:
H1 queries: When receive a query for keyword Wi , algorithm B responds as

H1 (Wi ) = hi 2 G1 if Wi is already in H1 list. Otherwise, it randomly picks xi 2 Z⇤p ,
and set hi = hxi . Then B responds H1 query as hi , and adds hWi , hi , xi i to the H1
list.

H2 queries:
• When receive a query for identity IDi , B responds as H2 (IDi ) = fi 2 G1 if
IDi is already in H2 list.

• Otherwise, B will flip a coin ci , where ci 2 {0, 1} with Pr[ci = 0] = .
(

If ci = 0,
If ci = 1,

fi = g b · g yi 2 G,
fi = g yi 2 G,

yi 2R Z⇤p
yi 2R Z⇤p

• At last, B adds hIDi , fi , yi , ci i to H2 list, then sends the value fi to adversary
A31 as the result of random oracle query.

Trapdoor Query: A31 can choose a keyword Wi and an identity IDi to B to perform
trapdoor queries. B will responds as follows:

1. For every trapdoor query, the algorithm above will be run by B. If ci = 0,
then B claims failure and terminates.

2. Otherwise, B will obtain hi = hxi and fi = g yi . It randomly picks t 2 Z⇤p . It
simulates the trapdoor as:

(Ti1 , Ti2 , Ti3 ) = (g xi t , g yi t , g t )
Since h = g ↵ , we have:
t/↵

g xi t = hxi t/↵ = hi

= H1 (W )t/↵

g yi t = H2 (ID)t
Forgery: Eventually algorithm A31 acquires a trapdoor from B, where B sets t = a.
Note: g xi a = hxi t/↵ = H1 (W )t/↵ , g a = g t .

(T1⇤ , T3⇤ ) = (g xi a , g a )
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Then, A31 announces an identity ID⇤ that will be the target to forged. We

assume that ID⇤ has been queried before. Then, if H2 (ID) = fi = g b · g yi , A31 forge
the trapdoor identity part as

T2⇤ = fia = g ab · g ayi
Moreover, B can output g ab =

T2
(g a )yi

=

g ab ·g ayi
.
(g a )yi

Next, we will explain the probability that B can output the correct answer. The
procedure should not abort during the queries phase. As we already known,
1
.
qH2 +1

(1

=

Therefore, the probability that B doesn’t abort during the queries phase is

1
) q H2
qH2 +1

1
e

where e is the base of nature logarithm. Subsequently, in the

forgery phase, if we want to calculate g ab , we need to find H2 (ID) = g b · g yi in H2

list. As the result, the probability will be 1/qH2 . Hence, the overall of B succeeding
is

✏
eqH2

as required. Then proof of theorem is completed.

Lemma 3.5 The trapdoor of our scheme is (t, ✏, qH1 ) semantically secure assuming
(t, ✏, qH1 )-DCDH assumption holds in G.
Proof: Let algorithm A32 be an attacker bounded in a polynomial time t, who

has advantage ✏ in breaking PEKSDS. A32 can perform at most qT trapdoor queries,

qH1 , qH2 hash function queries to H1 and H2 separately. Let B be an algorithm who
aims to solve DCDH problem with the probability at most ✏0 , and its running time is

similar to A32 . Thus, if DCDH problem holds in G1 , then ✏0 is a negligible function.
Consequently, ✏ is a negligible probability for A32 to break the PEKSDS scheme.

Let g be a generator of G1 , a, b be random numbers in Z⇤p . Algorithm B is given
b

g, g a , g b 2 G as input, and aims to compute g a . B proceeds as follows:

Setup & KeyGen: Algorithm B starts by setting g to be the system parameter. To

simulate receiver, B picks a generater g 2 G1 randomly, where h = g a . (g, h) is set

to be receiver ’s public key. a(= ↵) is set as receiver ’s private key. Finally, B gives

(g, g a , h) to the adversary A32 .

H1 , H2 -queries: At any time, A32 can issue at most qH1 and qH2 queries to random

oracles H1 and H2 separately. B simulates the responds. Two lists hWi , hi , xi , ci i
and hIDi , fi , yi i is maintained by B as the random oracle queries. The former one

is called H1 list and the later one is H2 list. They are empty at the beginning. The
random oracle query procedures are as follows:
H1 queries:
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• When receive a query for keyword Wi , B responds as H1 (Wi ) = hi 2 G1 if Wi
is already in H1 list.

• Otherwise, B will flip a coin ci , where ci 2 {0, 1} with Pr[ci = 0] = .
(

If ci = 0,
If ci = 1,

hi = g xi 2 G

hi = g axi 2 G

xi 2R Z⇤p
xi 2R Z⇤p

• At last, B adds hIDi , hi , xi , ci i to H1 list, then sends the value hi to adversary
A32 as the result of random oracle query.

H2 queries:
When receive a query for keyword IDi , algorithm B responds as H2 (IDi ) = fi 2

G if Wi is already in H2 list. Otherwise, randomly pick yi 2 Z⇤p , and set fi = g yi .
Then B responds H2 query as fi , and adds hIDi , fi , yi i to the H2 list.

Trapdoor Query: A32 can choose a keyword Wi and an identity IDi to B to perform
trapdoor queries. B will responds as follows:

1. For every trapdoor query, the algorithm above will be run by B. If ci = 0,
then B claims failure and terminates.

2. Otherwise, B will obtain hi = g axi and fi = g yi . It randomly picks t 2 Z⇤p . It
simulates the trapdoor as:

(Ti1 , Ti2 , Ti3 ) = (g xi t , g yi t , g t )
We have:

t/a

g xi t = g axi t/a = hi

= H1 (Wi )t/a

g yi t = fit = H2 (IDi )t
Forgery: Eventually algorithm A32 acquires a trapdoor from B, where B sets t = b.
Note: g yi b = H2 (ID)t .

(T2⇤ , T3⇤ ) = (g yi b , T3⇤ = g b )
given by B and announces an identity ID⇤ which will be forged. Note, B sets t = b
We assume that ID⇤ have been queried before. Then, if H1 (W ) = hi = g xi , A32
forge the trapdoor keyword part as

b

T1⇤ = H1 (W )t/↵ = g xi a
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b

Moreover, B can output g a =

T1⇤
g xi

b

=

g xi · a
g xi

.

Next, we will explain the probability that B can output the correct answer. The
procedure should not abort during the queries phase. As we already known,
1
.
qH1 +1

Therefore, the probability that B doesn’t abort during the queries phase is

1
) q H1
qH1 +1

(1

=

1
e

where e is the base of nature logarithm. Subsequently, in the

forgery phase, if we want to calculate g ab , we need to find H1 (W ) = g xi in H1 list.
As the result, the probability will be 1/qH1 . Hence, the overall of B succeeding is
✏
eqH1

as required. Then proof of theorem is completed.

3.4
3.4.1

Application
Multi-Receiver

In this section, we extend our PEKSDS scheme to a multi-user PEKSDS scheme.
In this part, we will introduce multi-receiver first. Assume sender Bob desires to
send emails to Alice and Carlos with the same keyword. In traditional PEKS, Bob
needs to compute keyword with receiver’s public key and moreover, maybe perform
some paring computing. Furthermore, if the computing capacity is insufficient,
the situation will be turned to thorny. In our scheme, this problem can be solved
straightforwardly. The only need is utilizing receiver’s public key, powering the key
with the same exponent as before, for example:
(C1 , C21 , C22 , ..., C2n ) = (H2 (ID)s · H1 (W )r , hr1 , hr2 , ..., hrn )
where h1 , h2 , ..., hn is the public key of the receiver 1, 2, ...n. Creating trapdoor and
testing process is the same as before. The proof can refer to [HL07]. This approach
reduces the communication and computation overhead and processes no less security.

3.4.2

Search Multi-Sender

To search multi-sender, we first introduce a simple version and show a general version. Suppose receiver Alice desires to search a keyword in the email sent by Bob
and David. Compared to create the trapdoor twice, we only need to add an element
in the trapdoor. The example will show receiver searches n senders’ together.
(T1 , T2 , T31 , T32 , ..., T3n ) = (H1 (W )t/↵ , g t , H2 (ID1 )t , H2 (ID2 )t , ..., H2 (IDn )t )
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where ID1 , ID2 , ..., IDn are the senders’ identities. Encryption and test phase is the
same as before. In addition, there is still no paring operation in our system.

3.4.3

A Modification of Our Scheme

We get this construct from [BGW05], using broadcast encryption inversely. Broadcast encryption aims to enable only qualified user to decryption. We change the
target that only qualified sender can be searched. The scheme is described as follows.
KeyGen: Let G, GT be two groups of prime order p, and ê be a bilinear map:
G ⇥ G ! GT . The algorithm first picks a random generator g 2 G and a random
↵ 2 Z⇤p , it computes g ↵ = h 2 G. Then, it picks a random
= g(

i)

2 Zp , it computes gi

2 G for i = 1, 2, ..., n, n + 2, ..., 2n. Next, it picks a random

2 Zp and sets

v = g 2 G. We will need two hash functions H1 : {0, 1} ! G and H2 : {0, 1}⇤ !
⇤

Zn . The public parameters are:

(g, h, g1 , ..., gn , gn+2 , ..., g2n , v) 2 G2n+2
We also compute decryption identities of senders in Zn is set as: di = gi 2 G. Note
that di = v (

i)

. The decryption identities will also be kept by TTP. The maximum

number of senders is n.
The master key kept by the TTP is ↵, gn+1 .
S is the set of senders in which the receiver wants to search.
The system will compute a hash value by using the sender’s identity and send back
a permanent identity (public key) to the sender as follows: H2 (ID) = i 2 {1, ...n}
and gi is the permanent identity for the sender.

Encryption: Sender picks a random number r 2 Zp , and uses his identity gi and
keyword W , computes

(C1 , C2 , C3 , C4 ) = (H1 (W )r , gir , g r , hr )
and transfers (C1 , C2 , C3 , C4 ) with the encrypted file to the server.
Trapdoor: Receiver(searcher) picks a random number t 2 Zp , computes
(T1 , T2 ) = (g t , H1 (W 0 )t )
and name set S to TTP.
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TTP will according to the set S to find the senders’ identities gi where i 2 S,

and computes

(T3 , T4 , ⇢i ) = (v ·

Y
j2S

↵
gn+1 j )↵ , gn+1
· T2 , di ·

Y

gn+1

j+i

j2S
j6=i

.
Then, TTP sends (T1 , T3 , T4 , ⇢1 , ..., ⇢s ) where |S| = s, to the server.
Test: Then, the server will search the keyword user by user. Test:
ê (T4 , C3 ) · ê (⇢i , C4 ) = ê (C1 , T1 ) · ê (T3 , C2 )
If the result is true, return the content corresponding to the keyword. Else, nothing.

3.5

Summary

In this chapter, we discuss the disadvantage of the public encryption with keyword search (PEKS) and from this we construct a provably secure keyword search
in trusted sender scheme by introducing sender’s identity into scheme. We have
proved the cyphertext is secure against IND-CIA-CKA, UF-CIA, and trapdoor is
secure against UF-CTA. In addition, it possesses the properties of signcryption and
improve the efficiency of combining encryption and signature. Our scheme can be
straightforward to be applied in cloud computing, since we don’t require paring operation in both sender and receiver. In addition, it can be extended to multi-sender
and multi-receiver much more efficiency. What’s more is that we confirm the identity of both sender and receiver. Therefore, our scheme extremely suits for cloud
computing.
As we have already known, the OT possesses the properties that protect both
the privacy of sender and receiver. Therefore, another interesting problem is that
we can build a scheme that performs combining OT and PEKS. The sender will
send the encrypted message and keyword by using the receivers’ or the server’s
public key, and the receiver conduct oblivious transfer with the database server, so
that performs both privacy. In the addition, the scenario could be performed in
multi-receiver and multi-sender environment.

Chapter 4
Symmetric key encryption with Keyword
Search
4.1

Introduction

Since regular private-key encryption prevents one from searching over encrypted
data, clients also lose the ability to selectively retrieve segments of their data. To
adress this problem, searchable symmetric encryption has been proposed [CGKO06,
SWP00]. Actually, they inherit the form of PEKS, which contains keywords encryption, trapdoors creation and tests. Unlike PEKS, symmetric encryption adopted
the method like what Bellare’s done [BBO06]. In that case, database servers can
reorder and conduct searching operation on encrypted data. That’s the reason why
we don’t employ the Bellare’s scheme.
Secure index [Goh03] provides symmetric encryption with search capabilities, in
which an index is a file that stores document collections while supporting efficient
keyword search. In other words, given a keyword, the index returns the corresponding contents that contain it. We say an index is secure if the search for a keyword
W can only be performed by users who set a trapdoor for W with a secret key,
and the index leaks no information about its contents without the knowledge of
trapdoors. Gho [Goh03] proposed a symmetric searchable encryption scheme from
a secure index, in which the user indexes and encrypts its document collection and
sends secure index together with the encrypted data to the server. When searching
for a keyword w, the user should generate and send a trapdoor for w such that the
email gateway can run the search algorithm to find the appropriate documents.
Ostrovsky and Goldreich [Ost90, GO96] designed a symmetric searchable encryption in full generality and optimal security, with which any type of search request
can be achieved (including conjunctions and disjunctions of keywords) without leaking any information to the email gateway. However, to guarantee strong privacy,
39
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it needs n rounds of interaction for each read and write where n is the number
of documents. Although a two-round solution is given, it needs large square-root
overhead.
However, the previously mentioned work focused only on the single user environment. If they are applied directly in the multi-user setting, the computation
overhead might be considerably large.

4.1.1

Contributions of This Chapter

We propose a symmetric key encryption with keyword search which has perfect security for both sender and receiver. In addition our scheme is based on a computable
assumption that is more secure than the one based on decisional assumption.
This chapter is structured as follows. We describe the symmetric keyword search
and security notion in Section 2. Then, in Section 3, we will give the detail of the
scheme and the security proof. Then, we will give conclusion in Section 4.

4.2

General Structure

4.2.1

Definition of Symmetric Key Encryption with Keyword Search

Definition 4.1 (SEKS) A symmetric key encryption with keyword search is made
of four randomized algorithms:

sp.

SysPara(k): Taking a security parameter k 2 N, it generates a system parameters
KeyGen(sp) : Taking system parameters sp as input, it generates key pairs

Apriv /Apub , and A0priv /A0pub for the receiver and sender respectively.
Encryption(A0pub , Apriv , W ): Taking receiver ’s Apub and sender ’s secret key A0priv ,
it generates the symmetric key and produces a searchable encryption EncW of keyword W .
Trapdoor(Apriv , A0pub , W 0 ): Taking sender ’s A0pub and receiver ’s secret key Apriv ,
0
it generates the symmetric key and produces the trapdoor TW
of keyword W 0 .
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0
Test (TW
, EncW ): Given the searchable encryption Enc(Apub , A0priv , W ), trapdoor

TW (Apriv , A0pub , W 0 ) and Apub . Output ‘yes’ while both W = W 0 and sender is
designated, or ‘no’ otherwise.

4.2.2

Security Model

We define SEKS is semantically secure against a static adversary. The encryption
and trapdoor possess security we called “indistinguishability against chosen keyword
attack” (IND-CKA). Let algorithm Ai (i = 1, 2) be an attacker who wants to attack

SKKS system bounded by polynomial time t. To illustrate security for SKKS, we
define two games between Ai and a challenger as follows:
Game1: A1 aims to distinguish the encryption by chosen keyword attack.
Setup & KeyGen: The challenger runs SysPara(k) to obtain system parameters
and generate key pairs Apriv /Apub , and A0priv /A0pub separately. Then sends Apub and
A0pub to A1 .
Query phase 1: A1 adaptively issues queries q1 , ..., qm for keywords Wi , where

1  i  m. The challenger responds with TW (Apriv , A0pub , Wi ) to A1 .

Challenge: A1 sends a pair W0 and W1 to challenger on which it wishes to

be challenged on. Next, the challenger picks a random
Enc(Apub , A0priv , W

2 {0, 1}. It sets Enc =

) and gives it A1 . The only requirement is that A1 hasn’t queried

pair W0 and W1 for trapdoor.

Query phase 2: A1 continues to adaptively issue pairs Wi for trapdoor. The only

constraint is that Wi 6= W0 , W1 . The challenger responds the same as in phase 1.
Guess: Algorithm A1 outputs its guess

=

0

0

.

2 {0, 1} for b and wins the game if

We refer to such an adversary A1 as encryption IND-CKA adversary. We defined

the advantage of A1 is attacking the scheme as
AdvA1 = Pr[ =

0

]

1
2

.
Game2: A2 aims to distinguish the trapdoor by chosen keyword attack.

4.3. Implement of a Symmetric Key Encryption with Keyword Search

42

Setup & KeyGen: The challenger runs SysPara(k) to obtain system parameters
and generate key pairs Apriv /Apub , and A0priv /A0pub separately. Then sends Apub and
A0pub to A2 .
Query phase 1: A2 adaptively issues queries q1 , ..., qm for keywords Wi , where

1  i  m. The challenger responds with TW (Apriv , A0pub , Wi ) to A2 .

Challenge: A2 sends a pair W0 and W1 to challenger on which it wishes to be

challenged on. Next, the challenger picks a random
Trapdoor(Apriv , A0pub , W 0 )

2 {0, 1}. It sets TW =

and gives it A2 . The only requirement is that A2 hasn’t

queried pair W0 and W1 for trapdoor.

Query phase 2: A2 continues to adaptively issue pairs Wi for trapdoor. The only

constraint is that Wi 6= W0 , W1 . The challenger responds the same as in phase 1.
Guess: Algorithm A2 outputs its guess

=

0

0

.

2 {0, 1} for b and wins the game if

We refer to such an adversary A2 as trapdoor IND-CKA adversary. We defined

the advantage of A2 is attacking the scheme as
AdvA2 = Pr[ =

0

]

1
2

.
Definition 4.2 Our SEKS scheme is (t, q, ✏)-semantically secure, if there exists no
adversary Ai (i 2 1, 2), who runs in at most t time and queries at most q times, the
probability at least ✏.

4.3

Implement of a Symmetric Key Encryption
with Keyword Search

4.3.1

Construction

SysParas:(q, g1 , g2 , H1 , H2 , G, GT , ê)

4.3. Implement of a Symmetric Key Encryption with Keyword Search

Notation

Interpretation

q

the prime order of group G

g1

$

G

a random generator of G

g2

$

G

a random generator of G

H1
H2
G
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a crypto-hash function maps {0, 1}⇤ ! G⇤q
a crypto-hash function maps GT ! Z⇤q
a multiplicative cyclic group

GT

a multiplicative cyclic group

ê

a bilinear map from G to GT
Table 4.1: System Parameter of SEKS

KeyGen:
Since anyone can be sender or receiver, everyone picks a random number xi 2 Z.

The public key is g1xi the private key is xi
Encrypt:

If user0 will send message to user1 , they compute
y = H2 (ê(g1x1 , g2 )x0 ) = H2 (ê(g1x0 , g2 )x1 )
Then, encrypt the keyword as
1

H1 (W ) y 2 G
Trapdoor:
(T1 = g1yt , T2 = ê(g1 , H1 (W ))t ) 2 G2 , t 2R Z
Correctness:
ê(g1yt , H1 (W )1/y ) = ê(g1 , H1 (W ))t )

4.3.2

Security Analysis

Theorem 4.1 Let G be a multiplicative bilinear group of prime order q. Our encryption is (t,✏,qT ) semantically secure against indistinguishable chosen keyword attack (IND-CKA) assuming the (t,✏,qT )-DCDH assumption holds in G.
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Proof: Let algorithm A1 be an attacker bounded in a polynomial time t, who has

advantage ✏ in breaking the encryption. A1 can perform at most qT trapdoor queries,

qH hash function queries to H1 . Let B be an algorithm who aims to solve DDH
problem with the probability at most ✏ =

✏0
2eqT
0

, and its running time is similar to

A1 . Thus, if DDH problem holds in G, then ✏ is a negligible function. Consequently,
✏ is a negligible probability for A1 to break the SEKS encryption.

Let g be a generator of G. Algorithm B is given g, g a , g b , u 2 G as input, to
a

determine whether g b equals to u or a random element in G. B proceeds as follows:
Setup & KeyGen: Algorithm B starts by setting g1 = g to be the system parameter.

To simulate users, algorithm B picks random numbers x1 , x2 2 Z⇤p , sets x1 , x2 are receiver ’s and sender ’s private keys separately and g x1 , g x2 are receiver ’s and sender ’s

public keys respectively . In addition, B picks a random element g2 2 G. Finally, B
gives (g, g2 , g x1 , g x2 ) to the adversary A1 .

H1 -queries: At any time, A1 can issue at most qH1 queries to random oracles H1 .
B simulates the responds. H1 list hWi , hi , zi , ci i is maintained by B as the random
oracle queries. It is empty at the beginning. The random oracle query procedure is
as follows:
• When receive a query for keyword Wi , B responds as H1 (Wi ) = hi 2 G if Wi
is already in H1 list.

• Otherwise, B will flip a coin ci 2 {0, 1} with Pr[ci = 0] = .
(

If ci = 0,
If ci = 1,

hi = g zi 2 G,

hi = g azi 2 G,

zi 2R Z⇤p
zi 2R Z⇤p

• At last, B adds hWi , hi , zi , ci i to H1 list, then sends the value hi to adversary
A1 as the result of random oracle query.

H2 -query: For H2 query, A1 only need to query one time, and B will response
1

g2H = g y = g b .

Query Phase: A1 can choose a keyword Wi to B to perform trapdoor queries. B will
responds as follows:

1. For every trapdoor query, the algorithm above will be run by B to derive H1
list such as hWi , hi , zi , ci i. If ci = 0, then B claims failure and terminates.
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2. Otherwise, B will obtain hi = g azi . In addition, it picks t 2R Z⇤p . Then, we
can simulate the trapdoor as:

1

(T1 , T2 ) = ((g b )t , ê(g t , g azi ))
Since, We have:
1

gy = g b
1

(g b )t = g yt
ê(g t , g azi ) = ê(g t , H1 (W ))
Challenge: Eventually algorithm A1 produces two keywords W1 , W0 that it wishes to

be challenged on. The only requirement is that W1 , W0 haven’t been queried before.
Algorithm B generates the challenge encryption as follows:
1. Algorithm B runs the above algorithm for responding to H1 -queries twice. If
neither of (c0 , c1 ) equals 0, then B claims failure and terminates.

2. Otherwise, at least one of c0 , c1 equals to 0. B picks i 2 {0, 1} randomly, and

sets W = Wi , where ci equal to 0. Note, if only one of c0 , c1 equals to 0,
there is no randomized. Let hWi , hi , zi , ci i be the corresponding tuples of the
H1 -list.

3. then algorithm B responds the challenge encryption as:
C = zx , z 2 G
a

if z = g b the following is true:
zx = g

ax
b

Query Phase2: A1 can continue to issue decryption queries for keywords Wi where
Wi 6= W0 , W1 . B will response as before.
Guess: A1 will guess
output nothing.

0

2 {0, 1} for . If

=

0

a

, B will output g b = u. Otherwise,

Next, we will explain the probability that B can output the correct answer. The

procedure should not abort during trapdoor queries and challenge phase. Therefore,
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1
eqT

, where e is

from the knowledge of previous chapter, we know the probability is

the base of nature logarithm. Moreover, If A1 can output the correct answer, B has
1
2

is

probability to solve the complexity assumption. Hence, the overall of B succeeding
✏
2eqT

as required. Then proof of theorem is completed.

Theorem 4.2 Let G be a multiplicative bilinear group of prime order p. The trapdoor of our system is (t, ✏, qT ) semantically secure against indistinguishable chosen
keyword attack (IND-CKA) assuming the (t, ✏, qT )-DBDH assumption holds in G.
Proof: Let algorithm A2 be an attacker bounded in a polynomial time t, who has

advantage ✏ in breaking the encryption. A2 can perform at most qT trapdoor queries.

Let B be an algorithm who aims to solve DBDH problem with the probability at
most ✏0 =

✏
2eqT
0

, and its running time is similar to A2 . Thus, if DBDH problem holds

in G, then ✏ is a negligible function. Consequently, ✏ is a negligible probability for
A2 to break the SEKS trapdoor.

1

Let g be a generator of G. Algorithm B is given g, g a , g b , g c 2 G and V 2 GT
ab

as input, to determine whether ê(g, g) c equals to V or a random element in GT . B
proceeds as follows:

Setup & KeyGen: Algorithm B starts by setting g1 = g to be the system parameter.

To simulate users, algorithm B picks a random number x1 , x2 2 Z⇤p , sets x1 , x2 is
receiver ’s and sender ’s private key separately and g x1 , g x2 is receiver ’s and sender ’s
public key separately . In addition, B picks a random element g2 2 G. Finally, B
gives (g, g2 , g x1 , g x2 ) to the adversary A2 .

H1 -queries: At any time, A2 can issue at most qH1 queries to random oracles H1 .
B simulates the responds. H1 list hWi , hi , zi , ci i is maintained by B as the random
oracle queries. It is empty at the beginning. The random oracle query procedure is
as follows:
• When receive a query for keyword Wi , B responds as H1 (Wi ) = hi 2 G if Wi
is already in H1 list.

• Otherwise, B will flip a coin ci 2 {0, 1} with Pr[ci = 0] = .
(

If ci = 0,
If ci = 1,

hi = g zi 2 G,

hi = g azi 2 G,

zi 2R Z⇤p
zi 2R Z⇤p
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• At last, B adds hWi , hi , zi , ci i to H1 list, then sends the value hi to adversary
A1 as the result of random oracle query.

H2 -query: For H2 query, A2 only needs to query one time, and B will response as
g H2 = g y = g c .

Query Phase: A2 can choose a keyword Wi to B to perform trapdoor queries. B will
responds as follows:

1. For every trapdoor query, the algorithm above will be run by B to derive H1
list such as hWi , hi , zi , ci i. If ci = 0, then B claims failure and terminates.

2. Otherwise, B will obtain hi = g azi . In addition, it picks t = cb . Then, we can
simulate the trapdoor as:

(T1 , T2 ) = (g b , ê(g b , g

azi
c

))

Since, We have:
gy = gc
b

g b = g c· c = g yt
ê(g b , g

azi
c

b

) = ê(g c , g azi ) = ê(g t , H1 (W ))

Challenge: Further, algorithm A2 produces two keywords W1 , W0 that it wishes to

be challenged on. The only requirement is that W1 , W0 haven’t been queried before.
Algorithm B generates the challenge encryption as follows:
1. Algorithm B runs the above algorithm for responding to H1 -queries twice. If
neither of (c0 , c1 ) equals 0, then B claims failure and terminates.

2. Otherwise, at least one of c0 , c1 equals to 0. B picks i 2 {0, 1} randomly, and

sets W = Wi , where ci equal to 0. Note, if only one of c0 , c1 equals to 0,
there is no randomized. Let hWi , hi , zi , ci i be the corresponding tuples of the
H1 -list.

3. Then algorithm B responds the challenge encryption as:
(T1 , T2 ) = (g b , V z ), V 2 GT
ab

if V = ê(g, g) c , the following is true:
V z = ê(g, g)

abz
c

b

= ê(g c , g az ) = ê(g t , H1 (W ))
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Query Phase2: A2 can continue to issue decryption queries for keywords Wi where
Wi 6= W0 , W1 . B will response as before.
Guess: A2 will guess

0

2 {0, 1} for

Otherwise, output nothing.

. If

=

0

ab

, B will output V = ê(g, g) c .

Next, we will explain the probability that B can output the correct answer. Since

our scheme employs symmetric key encryption techniques, hence A2 and B have the

same probability to break the scheme and complexity assumption separately as the
previous theorem. Then proof of theorem is completed.

4.4

Summary

In order to solve the problem that users with limited resources or expertise, can selectively retrieve segments of their data at low cost, symmetric encryption with search
capabilities is proposed. In this chapter, we proposed a symmetric key encryption
with keyword search scheme. Regarding the security reduction, we define a security notion called “indistinguishability against chosen keyword attack” (IND-CKA)
between a static adversary and a challenger. Compared to the existing symmetric
encryption with keyword search schemes, our new scheme can be applied among
multiple users. Moreover, our construction is based on a computable assumption
that is more secure than the one based on decisional assumption. In addition, our
construction can be easily extended to multi-user setting.

Chapter 5
Oblivious keyword search
5.1

Introduction

Before the Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search has been proposed, Oblivious Transfer (OT ) was always being considered as the best way to construct a
security communication channel between sender and receiver. Since the property of
OT is very suitable for conducting keyword search, sender knows nothing about the
receiver’s choices, and receiver can not obtain extra information except his choices.
Therefore, Ogata and Kurosawa proposed an oblivious keyword search scheme based
on OT [OK04]. Before introducing Ogata’s scheme, we will bring in another OT
scheme , in order that readers can have a preliminary imagination about OT .
Chu and Tzeng proposed two efficient oblivious transfer schemes with adaptive
and non-adaptive queries [CT05]. In their scheme, sender commits all data to receiver firstly, which are random numbers from the receivers’ perspective. Then, the
receiver makes queries to the sender who will responds by supplying corresponding
secret keys of his choices. As we must mention here, these keys can only decrypt
the files the receiver has chosen. For the other files, the result of receiver’s calculation is just like random numbers. Furthermore, one of their schemes can be
extended to adaptive OT . Although the receiver can send the queries one by one
adaptively, the scheme provides the same security as the non-adaptive one. Therefore, this property extremely suits keyword search. Additionally, it is also suitable
for searching in a public database. For this reason, we have thought that using accumulator to integrate the search item, and it fulfills the property of pay-as-you-use in
cloud computing. The author also gives some comparisons between Mu’s [MZV02],
Naor’s [NP99b], Ogata’s [OK04] schemes and themselves’, and their schemes have
more advantages than most of theirs. Thus, our second application is based on it.
Back to Ogata and Kurosawa’s scheme, they firstly proposed the concept of
49

5.1. Introduction

50

oblivious transfer. Compared with traditional OT , their proposal not only uses
keyword instead of the index to conduct keyword search, but also utilizes blind
signature to process keyword extract, which illuminates the following researchers to
perform keyword extract in the similar way [CKRS09].
Oblivious Polynomial Evaluation (OPE) was first proposed in 1999 [NP99a,
NP06], which is a variant of OT . Instead of committing all the data to receiver,
sender inputs a polynomial function such as P() . Receiver will input a value such
as ↵. When ↵ is the root of P() , the function P(↵) will return the result the receiver
want to obtain. Otherwise, the receiver gets nothing from sender since the result
will be like a random number. There are many applications for OPE, such as mutually authenticated key exchange, private comparison of data. Similarly, OPE can be
extended to keyword search. Freedman has proposed a keyword search scheme with
oblivious pseudorandom functions based on OPE [FIPR05]. They use a pseudorandom function to perform OPE, then employ it to compute P()

M where M is the

message and the root is keyword which will make P() equals to zero. Since the pseudorandom function is published, the user can execute keyword search by him. On
the other hand, the authors haven’t supply such a pseudorandom function, though it
inherit the OT ’s property of protect both sender’s and receiver’s privacy. Therefore
the method is worth to continue thinking about. Similarly, [GSW04, ZB07] utilized
OPE to perform oblivious transfer as well.

5.1.1

Contributions of This Chapter

We propose oblivious keyword search scheme and public encryption with oblivious
keyword search scheme in this chapter. Since Oblivious Transfer (OT) guarantees
both sender’s and receiver’s privacy, it can be easily transformed to Oblivious Keyword (OKS) Search. The first scheme combines OT and PEKS directly. In our
second OKS scheme, we assume the database can be updated by every user. Thus,
Public Encryption with Oblivious Keyword Search (PEOKS) enables that anyone
can be sender encrypted data by the same public key. The scheme improved the
convenience of receiver.
This chapter is structured as follows. We describe the oblivious keyword search
and security notion in Section 5.2. Then, Section 5.3, 5.4 will give the detail of the
scheme and the security proof. Then, we will summarize this chapter in Section 5.5.
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General Structure

5.2.1

Definition of Oblivious Keyword Search

The oblivious keyword search (OKS) involves two parties: Server (S) and Receiver
(R). Let W be the set of keywords, and M be the set of messages.
Definition 5.1 (OKS) An oblivious keyword search scheme is made of follow phases:
1. R takes random numbers to mask the keyword and sends masked keyword to
S.
2. S using masked keyword to encrypt the message and send them back with his
public key.
3. R can decrypt the message if and only if the keywords are matched.
Definition 5.2 (PEOKS) A public key encryption with keyword search is made of
four randomized algorithms:

sp.

SysPara: Taking a security parameter k 2 N, it generates a system parameters
KeyGen : Taking system parameters sp as input, it generates Server s’ key pair

Apriv /Apub .
Commitment: Taking random numbers and keywords as input, it generates
masked keywords W .
Encryption: Taking Server ’s Apub , keywords W and message as input, it generates the encryption of keyword W . Meanwhile, taking Server ’s Apriv and masked
keywords as input, it generates the decryption key.
Decryption: Taking the decryption key and ciphertext as input, It decrypts the
message if and only if the keywords matched.

5.2.2

Security Model

Let us assume that Server holds n messages m1 , m2 , ..., mn and Receiver’s k keywords
are W1 , W2 , ..., Wk . We need to know that two sets Y and Y 0 are di↵erent if there is

x in Y, but not in Y 0 , or vice versa. For the scheme oblivious keyword search, the
following security requirements will be listed below:
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1. Receiver’s privacy - indistinguishability: for any two di↵erent sets of choices Y
= W1 , W2 , ..., Wk and Y 0 = W10 , W20 , ..., Wk0 , the transcripts, corresponding to Y

and Y 0 , received by the sender are indistinguishable. The choices of Receiver
are proven to be unconditionally secure, if it is found that the received messages
of Server for Y and Y 0 are distributed identically.
2. Server’s privacy - indistinguishability: for any choice set C = W1 , W2 , ..., Wk ,
the unchosen messages should be indistinguishable from the random ones.
If the ciphertexts of unchosen messages are uniformly distributed for R, the security
of S is unconditional.
Public encryption with oblivious keyword search scheme should meet the following security requirements:
1. Receiver’s privacy - indistinguishability: the same as the case of the oblivious
keyword search receiver.
2. Server’s privacy - compared with the Ideal model: in the Ideal model, the
sender sends all messages and the receiver sends his choices to the trusted
third party (TTP). TTP then sends the chosen messages to the receiver. This
is the securest way to implement the public encryption with oblivious keyword
search scheme. The receiver R cannot obtain extra information from the server
in the Ideal model. We say that the servers privacy is achieved if for any
receiver R in the real public encryption with oblivious keyword search scheme,
there is another simulator R’ in the Ideal model such that the outputs of R
and R’ are indistinguishable.

5.3

Implement of Oblivious Keyword Search

Our first oblivious keyword search scheme is based on a non-adaptive oblivious
transfer scheme. The scheme inherit the nice property of universal parameters from
Chu’s Scheme[CT05]. Compared with others’ schemes, our scheme gives a faster
way to perform test. Instead of using every trapdoor to test keyword one by one,
we only need to test one time to achieve keyword searching. Moreover, our scheme
doesn’t need extra variable to prevent the privacy against malicious server. The
construction shows as follow:
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Construction

System parameters:(q, g1 , g2 , g3 , H1 , H2 , G, GT , ê)
Notation

Interpretation

q

the prime order of group G

g1

$

G

a random generator of G

g2

$

G

a random generator of G

g3

$

G

a random generator of G
a crypto-hash function maps {0, 1}⇤ ! Z⇤q

H1

a crypto-hash function maps GT ! {0, 1}log q

H2
G

a multiplicative cyclic group

GT

a multiplicative cyclic group

ê

a bilinear map:G ⇥ G ! GT

Table 5.1: System Parameters of Oblivious Keyword Search
Server(S) has message M1 , M2 , ..., Mn
with the corresponding keyword W1 , W2 , ..., Wn .
S selects ↵ 2R Z and sets ↵ as his private key, and (h = g1↵ ) as his public key.
Receiver(R) has the keywords he want to searchW10 , W20 , ..., Wk0 .
Step1: R chooses three polynomials
f1 (x) = a0 + a1 x + a2 x2 + ... + ak 1 xk

1

f2 (x) = b0 + b1 x + b2 x2 + ... + bk 1 xk

1

f3 (x) = c0 + c1 x + c2 x2 + ... + ck 1 xk

1

⌘ (x

H1 (W10 ))(x

H1 (W20 ))...(x

+ xk (mod q) 2 Zq

+ xk (mod q) 2 Zq

+ xk (mod q) 2 Zq
H1 (Wk0 ))

Step2: R computes:
g1a0 , g1a1 , g1a2 , ..., g1ak
b

1
c

g2b0 g3c0 , g2b1 g3c1 , ..., g2k 1 g3k 1 ,
and sends them to S.
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Step3: S computes:
f (i)

g1 1

a
a H1 (Wi ) a2 H1 (Wi )2
g1
...g1 k

= g1a0 g1 1

f (i) f (i)

g2 2 g3 3
b

...g2k

1 H1 (Wi )

k 1

H (Wi )k

g1 1

b H1 (Wi ) c1 H1 (Wi ) b2 H1 (Wi )2 c2 H1 (Wi )2
g3
g2
g3

= g2b0 g3c0 g21

1 H1 (Wi )

k 1

c

1 H1 (Wi )

g3k

k 1

H (Wi )k H1 (Wi )k
g3

g2 1

and computes:
[C1 , C2 ] = [hri , Mi

f (i)

f (i) f (i)

H2 (ê(g11 , (g22 g33 )ri )↵ )] ri 2r Z

then sends to R.
Step4: R computes
Mi = C 2

f (i)

H2 (ê(C1 , g22 )f1 (i) )

Correctness: If Wi = Wk0 , the value of function f3 (i) equals to zero, receiver can
obtain the message. Else return ?.

5.3.2

Security Analysis

R’s privacy:
Theorem 5.1 For our scheme, R’s choices are unconditionally secure
Proof. For every tuple (c00 , c01 , c02 , ..., c0k 1 ), there is a tuple (b00 , b1 , b02 , ..., b0k 1 ) satisfies
b 0 c0

g2bi g3ci = g2i g3i for i = 0, 1, ..., k

1.

S’s Privacy:
Theorem 5.2 Let G be a multiplicative bilinear group of prime order p. Our system
is (t, ✏, qT , qH2 ) semantically secure against indistinguishable chosen keyword attack
(IND-CKA) assuming the (t, ✏, qT , qH2 )-DBDH assumption holds in G.
Proof. We show that for all i 2
/ {W1 , W2 , ..., Wk }, Mi ’s look random if the DBDH assumption holds. Assume that there is a polynomial-time distinguisher D = (D1 , D2 ),

where D1 takes k keywords as inputs and outputs f1⇤ (x), f2⇤ (x), f3⇤ (x), and D2 distinguishes the following two distributions:
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f (i)

• X : ê(hf1 (i) , g22 )ri ,

where h, g2 2 G, ri 2R Zq .

• E: Rf1 (i)f2 (i) ,

where R 2 GT .

Then we can construct another PPTM D0 , which takes D as subroutine to dis-

tinguish two distributions:

• Ye1 : g, g a , g b , g c , ê(g, g)abc ,

where g 2 G, a, b, c 2R Zq

• Ye2 : g, g a , g b , g c , z.

where g 2 G, a, b, c 2R Zq z 2r GT

The di↵erence between (Ye1 , Ye2 ) and (Y1 , Y2 ) is that g can’t be 1 in Ye1 and Ye2 .
Machine D0 :

Input (g, g a , g b , g c ) (either from Ye1 or Ye2 .)

1. Let g = g1 , g a = h = g ↵ , g b = g2 and randomly select g3 2 G.
2. Randomly pick r1 , r2 , ..., rn 2R Zq ,

Let g r1 = g c1 , g r2 = g c2 , ..., g rn = g cn .

3. Compute the value of H1 (W1 ), H1 (W2 ), ..., H1 (Wk ),
then perform D1 (H1 (W1 ), H1 (W2 ), ..., H1 (Wk )) as (f1 (i), f2 (i), f3 (i)).
4. Randomly select i 2 H1 (Wi ).
5. Output D2 (g ⇤ , h⇤ , f1⇤ (x), f2⇤ (x), f3⇤ (x)) for all i 2 H1 (Wi ), where
(
hci , ê(g af1 (i) , g bf2 (i) )ci ,
if i 2 i1 , ..., il
(C1 , C2 )
hci , z f1 (i)f2 (i) ,
if 2 il+1 , ..., in k
If D have a non-negligible advantage ✏ to distinguish X , Y1 and Y2 can be

distinguished by D0 in the DBDH problem with at least non-negligible advantage
✏

2/q. This finished the proof.
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Public Key Encryption with Oblivious Keyword Search

5.4.1

Construction

Our Second oblivious keyword search scheme is based on an adaptive scheme which
means receiver can send his query one by one, and modify his choice whenever he
wants. Additionally, it provides the same security as the non-adaptive version. In
our scheme, we introduce the public key to the scheme. If we look at the scheme
as public key encryption with keyword search, the scheme is secure against o✏ine
guessing attack. Thus we choose blind extraction to provide trapdoor security. The
construction shows as follows:
• Server(S) has message M1 , M2 , ..., Mn

with the corresponding keyword W1 , W2 , ..., Wn .

• Receiver(R) has the keywords he want to searchW10 , W20 , ..., Wk0 .
SysParas: (q, g, H1 , H2 , G, GT , ê)
Notation

Interpretation

q

the prime order of group G

g

$

H1
H2
G

G

a random generator of G
a crypto-hash function maps {0, 1}⇤ ! G

a crypto-hash function maps GT ! {0, 1}log q
a multiplicative cyclic group

GT

a multiplicative cyclic group

ê

a bilinear map:G ⇥ G ! GT
Table 5.2: System Parameters of PEOKS

KeyGen:
Server(S) randomly selects ↵1 , ..., ↵n 2R Z and sets ↵i where i 2 n as his private

key, and (hi = g1↵i ) as his public key.
Commitment:
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Receiver(R) computes Aj = H1 (Wj )g tj , where randomly picks tj 2 Z⇤q and sends

A1 , A2 , A3 , ..., Ak to Server(S).
Encryption:

Server(S) computes: Dj = (Aj )↵i , Ci = Mi H2 (e(H(Wi ), hri i )), where randomly
picks ri 2 Z⇤q , then, sends
(g r1 , C1 ), (g r2 , C2 ), ..., (g rn , Cn ), D1 , D2 , ..., Dk
to R.
Decryption:
t

R computes Kj = Dj /hij , Mj = Ci

H2 (ê(Kj , g ri )) for j = 1, ..., k

Correctness:
M = Ci

H2 (Dj /htj , g ri )

= Mi

H2 (ê(H1 (Wi ), hri i ))

= Mi

H2 (ê(H1 (Wi ), hri i ))

t

H2 (ê(H1 (Wj )↵i · g ↵i tj /hij , g ri ))
H2 (ê(H1 (Wj )↵i , g ri ))

= Mi
In this scheme, we can add another role sender. Server will hold the private key ↵. Sender can use public key h to encrypt the keyword as (C1 , C2 ) =
(H2 (e(H1 (Wi ), hri )), g ri ).

Receiver will search the keyword described as in the

scheme above.

5.4.2

Security Analysis

R’s Privacy:
Theorem 5.3 For our scheme, R’s choices are unconditionally secure
For any Aj = H1 (Wj ) · g aj , and Wl , where l 6= j, there is an a0l that satisfies
0

Aj = wl g al . For S, Aj can be a masked value of any index. Thus, the receiver’s
privacy is unconditional secure.
S’s Privacy:
Theorem 5.4 Let G be a multiplicative bilinear group of prime order p. Our system
is (t, ✏, qT , qH2 ) semantically secure against indistinguishable chosen keyword attack
(IND-CKA) assuming the (t, ✏, qT , qH2 )-DBDH assumption holds in G.
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Proof: Let algorithm A be an attacker bounded in a polynomial time t, who has
advantage ✏ in breaking our scheme. A can perform at most qT trapdoor queries,

qH1 , qH2 hash function queries to H1 and H2 separately. Let B be an algorithm
who aims to solve DBDH problem with the probability at most ✏0 =

✏
,
eqT qH2
0

and

its running time is similar to A. Thus, if DBDH problem holds in G, then ✏ is a

negligible function. Consequently, ✏ is a negligible probability for A to break our
scheme.

Let g be a generator of G. Algorithm B is given u1 = g a , u2 = g b , u3 = g c 2 G

and ê(g, g)z 2 GT as input, to determine whether ê(g, g)abc equals to ê(g, g)z or a
random element in GT . Algorithm B simulate the challenger to interact with A. B
proceeds as follows:

Setup & KeyGen: Algorithm B starts by setting g = g to be the system parameter.

Then, algorithm B sets h = g ↵i = g ai where i 2 n. In another word, (g, h1 , h2 , ..., hn )
is public key, and ↵i where hi = g ↵i is set to be secret key. Therefore, Ppub is u1i

where hi = ua1i and secret key is ai . Finally, B gives (g, u1i ) where i 2 n to the
adversary A.

H1 , H2 -queries: At any time, A can issue at most qH1 and qH2 queries to random

oracles H1 and H2 separately. To simulate the responds, B maintains hWi , fi , xi , ci i

called H1 list as the random oracle query. It is empty at the beginning. The random
oracle query procedure is as follows:
• When receive a query for keyword Wi , B responds as H1 (Wi ) = fi 2 G if Wi
is already in H1 list.

• Otherwise, B will flip a coin ci 2 {0, 1} with Pr[ci = 0] = .
(

If ci = 0,
If ci = 1,

fi = u2 · g xi 2 G,
fi = g xi 2 G,

xi 2R Z⇤p

xi 2R Z⇤p

• At last, B adds hWi , fi , xi , ci i to H1 list, then sends the value fi to adversary
A as the result of random oracle query.

To simulate the H2 queries, algorithm B maintains a H2 list hy, V i as the random

oracle query. For every query H2 (y), B picks a new random value V 2 {0, 1}log q as
the value of H2 (y) for each new y. Moreover, hy, V i will be added to H2 list. H2
list is also empty at the start.
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Query Phase 1: A can choose a keyword Wi to B to perform encryption queries. B
will responds as follows:

1. For every encryption query, the algorithm above will be run by B to derive H1
list such as hWi , fi , xi , ci i. If ci = 0, then B claims failure and terminates.

2. Otherwise, B will obtain fi = g xi .
3. To simulate R, B randomly picks t1 , t2 , ..., tk 2 k and outputs A1 , A2 , ..., Ak as
g x1 · g t1 , g x2 · g t2 , ..., g xk · g tk
4. To simulate S, B use t1 , t2 , ..., tk above. Then, simulates the decryption key
Di as:

u1 xi⇤i⇤ · u1 ti⇤i⇤
Since hi = g ↵i , we have:
u1 xi⇤i⇤ · u1 ti⇤i⇤ = g xi⇤ ↵i⇤ · g ti⇤ ↵i⇤ = H1 (Wi⇤ ) · hti⇤i⇤ = Di⇤
Challenge: Eventually algorithm A produces two keywords W0 , W1 that it wishes to

be challenged on. The only requirement is that W0 , W1 haven’t been queried before.
Algorithm B generates the challenge encryption as follows:
1. Algorithm B runs the above algorithm for responding to H1 -queries and H2 -

queries twice. If neither of (c0 , c1 ) equals 0, then B claims failure and terminates.

2. Otherwise, at least one of c0 , c1 equals to 0. B picks i 2 {0, 1} randomly, and

sets W = Wi , where ci equal to 0. Note, if only one of c0 , c1 equals to 0,
there is no randomized. Let hWi , fi , xi , ci i be the corresponding tuples of the
H1 -list.

3. Let ri = ci , and then algorithm B responds the challenge encryption as:
[g ri , C ] = [u3i , Vi ],

Vi 2 {0, 1}log q

Since, we have
Vi = H2 (ê(H1 (Wi ), u1 ci i )) = H2 (ê(u2 · g xi , g ci ai ) = H2 (ê(g, g)ai ci (b+xi ) )
Note: Ci = Mi

r

H2 (ê(H1 (Wi ), hi i )) where Mi will not a↵ect on encryption, we omit Mi here. Therefore
r

Ci is simplified for H2 (ê(H1 (Wi ), hi i )).
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Query Phase2: A can continue to issue decryption queries for keywords Wi where
Wi 6= W0 , W1 . B will response as before.
Guess: A will guess

0

2 {0, 1} for . If

=

0

, B will output ê(g, g)ai bci according

to t/ê(u1i , u3i ), since t must be queried in H2 list. Otherwise, output nothing.

Next, we will explain the probability that B can output the correct answer. The

procedure should not abort during trapdoor queries and challenge phase. Therefore,
from the knowledge of previous chapter, we know the probability is

1
eqT

, where e is

the base of nature logarithm. Moreover, If A1 can output the correct answer, B
should find the ê(g, g)a bc in H2 list. Hence, the overall of B succeeding is

✏
eqT qH

as

required. Then proof of theorem is completed.

5.5

Summary

We have presented two very efficient oblivious keyword search schemes with perfect
security of either receiver or server. Since Oblivious Transfer (OT) ensures both
sender’s and receiver’s privacy is warranted, it can be easily transformed to Oblivious
Keyword Search (OKS). Therefore, in the first scheme, we employ the OT to perform
keyword search. Meanwhile, we improve it with PEKS to achieve public encryption
with oblivious keyword search. In our second OKS scheme, the database is assumed
to be updated by every user. Thus, Public Key Encryption with Oblivious Keyword
Search (PEOKS) enables that everyone can be the sender and encrypt data by the
same public key. The scheme improved the convenience for receiver. As a result,
their privacy and security is governed.

Chapter 6
Conclusion
In this thesis, we have demonstrated the keyword search on encrypted data. Our
research focuses on the privacy in which the party who requests a service discloses
the minimum personal information, where the party that o↵ers the data is guaranteed that only the requested data is revealed. In this chapter, we will outline the
contribution of our research and future work of searching on encrypted data.

6.1

Contributions

At the beginning of the thesis, we introduced three scenarios. Following on, our thesis explored these scenarios, reviewed the related work and proposed four schemes.
We summarize the major contributions as follows:
• In the first scenario, we require that the search not only matches the keywords, but also should be in designated users. For example, in email system,
this addresses the problem that the user who has known the keyword in the
trapdoor may send junk mails to the receiver. As a result, we have defined the
concept of Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search in Designated Sender
(PEKSDS) in Chapter 3. The intuition of the scheme is based on Public Encryption with Keyword Search scheme (PEKS) and signcryption. Moreover,
we have extended the scheme to multi-user setting.
• In the second scenario, our research focuses on improving security level from
the schemes based on dicisional assumptions. The best possible solution is

to employ symmetric key encryption. However, the symmetric searchable encryption is usually used in single-user setting. By the inspiration of utilizing
symmetric searchable encryption in interactive scenario, we propose our second scheme which possesses the properties of symmetric encryption and based
61
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on the Diffie-Hellman key exchange in Chapter 4. In our scheme, the symmetric key using in trapdoor creation is produced by Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
In addition, our scheme can be easily extended to multi-user setting.
• In the last scenario, since Oblivious Transfer (OT) ensures both sender’s and

receiver’s privacy are warranted, it can be easily transformed to Oblivious
Keyword Search (OKS). Hence, we proposed two schemes in Chapter 5. The
first of our OKS schemes combines OT and PEKS directly. In our second
OKS scheme, we assume the database can be updated by every user. Thus,
Public Key Encryption with Oblivious Keyword Search (PEOKS) enables that
everyone can be the sender and encrypt data by the same public key. The
scheme improved the convenience for receiver.

6.2

Future Work

Although crypto-based keyword search has attracted enough eyeballs, improvement
is still needed. The issues need to be considered in future are outlined as below:
• Public key encryption with keyword search under standard model. The scheme
can be proved under random oracle model might not get the proof under

standard model. Thus, PEKS under standard model is an interesting topic
for the researchers. The first PEKS scheme evolved from the Identity-based
Encryption (IBE) scheme. Currently, some IBE schemes can be proved under
standard model. Hence, the construction of a PEKS under standard model
will become a hot topic in the future.
• The computational time for keyword search requires more attention. Due to
rapid development of cloud computing, people are more and more familiar to

the “pay as you go” model. As a result, how to reduce the consumption of
time on searching encrypted data will turn to a valuable subject.
• Homomorphic encryption with keyword search. The lattice based encryption

is predicted to be next generation of encryption that resists against quantum
computing. Since Gentry[Mit09] first proposed fully homomorphic encryption using ideal lattice, the homomorphic encryption has already attracted researchers’ attention. Moreover, the property of homomorphic encryption suits
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for searching on encrypted data. Therefore, the homomorphic encryption with
keyword search will lead the way of searchable encryption research.
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